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Field
Abstract
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Before
In this study, we conduct a dictator game experiment with the COVID-19 vaccinated and unvaccinated people in Japan, and ascertain allocation tendencies between two anonymous individuals, between two vaccinated individuals or two unvaccinated individuals, and between a vaccinated individual and an unvaccinated individual. By so doing, we assess “ingroup bias,” “outgroup bias,” and “ingroup-favoritism” of vaccinated and unvaccinated people, respectively. Here, ingroup bias is defined as the difference between the money amounts allocated to an individual of the same group as the allocator and to an anonymous individual in the dictator game experiment. Outgroup bias is defined as the difference between the money amounts allocated to an individual of a different group from the allocator’s and to an anonymous one, and ingroup-favoritism is defined as the difference between the money amounts allocated to an individual of the same group and to an individual of the different group.
Specifically, we employ an experimental design that allows for both between- and within-individual comparisons to conduct the following analyses. First, in the between-analysis, we test the existence of ingroup bias, outgroup bias, and ingroup-favoritism in each group of vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals. In addition, we examine how these biases differ between vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals. We further investigate how the biases change between when the vaccination status of the allocator is not informed to the recipient and when it is informed to them.
Next, in the within-analysis, we test whether individuals' ingroup bias, outgroups bias, and ingroup favoritism are associated with their real-world behavior. In both the vaccinated and unvaccinated group, we examine the association between their biases and attitudes toward the COVID-19-related policies. In the vaccinated group, we also examine the association between their biases and the timing of COVID-19 vaccination.
To stably manage a society under a pandemic, it is crucial to build cooperative relationships between vaccinated and unvaccinated people. This study can contribute to the smooth construction of such cooperative relationships.
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After
In this study, we conduct a dictator game experiment with the COVID-19 vaccinated and unvaccinated people in Japan, and ascertain allocation tendencies between two anonymous individuals, between two vaccinated individuals or two unvaccinated individuals, and between a vaccinated individual and an unvaccinated individual. By so doing, we assess “ingroup bias,” “outgroup bias,” and “ingroup-favoritism” of vaccinated and unvaccinated people, respectively. Here, ingroup bias is defined as the difference between the money amounts allocated to an individual of the same group as the allocator and to an anonymous individual in the dictator game experiment. Outgroup bias is defined as the difference between the money amounts allocated to an individual of a different group from the allocator’s and to an anonymous one, and ingroup-favoritism is defined as the difference between the money amounts allocated to an individual of the same group and to an individual of the different group.
Specifically, we employ an experimental design that allows for both between- and within-individual comparisons to conduct the following analyses. First, in the between-analysis, we test the existence of ingroup bias, outgroup bias, and ingroup-favoritism in each group of vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals. In addition, we examine how these biases differ between vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals. We further investigate how the biases change between when the vaccination status of the allocator is not informed to the recipient and when it is informed to them.
Next, in the within-analysis, we test whether individuals' ingroup bias, outgroups bias, and ingroup favoritism are associated with their real-world attitudes and behaviors. In both the vaccinated and unvaccinated group, we examine the association between their biases and attitudes toward the COVID-19-related policies. In the vaccinated group, we also examine the association between their biases and the timing of COVID-19 vaccination.
To stably manage a society under a pandemic, it is crucial to build cooperative relationships between vaccinated and unvaccinated people. This study can contribute to the smooth construction of such cooperative relationships.
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Field
Last Published
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Before
February 08, 2022 08:33 PM
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After
February 10, 2022 03:51 AM
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Field
Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
We conduct dictator game experiments in the following five conditions:
(I) Anonymous: A recipient is anonymous for an allocator. The allocator is also anonymous for the recipient.
(II) Private-Ingroup: An allocator is informed that a recipient belongs to the ingroup (a vaccinated individual in the vaccinated sample, or an unvaccinated individual in the unvaccinated sample). The allocator is also anonymous for the recipient.
(III) Private-Outgroup: An allocator is informed that a recipient belongs to the outgroup (an unvaccinated individual in the vaccinated sample, or a vaccinated individual in the unvaccinated sample). The allocator is also anonymous for the recipient.
(IV) Public-Ingroup: An allocator is informed that a recipient belongs to the ingroup. The recipient is notified of the vaccination status of the allocator.
(V) Public-Outgroup: An allocator is informed that a recipient belongs to the outgroup. The recipient is notified of the vaccination status of the allocator.
One subject participates in five dictator game experiments as an allocator. We randomly set the order of the above conditions to create eight groups in the vaccinated and unvaccinated samples, respectively. After we first present the dictator game in the Anonymous condition (I) in all the eight groups, we randomly set the order of the Private (II, III) and Public (IV, V) conditions. Then, within each of the Private and Public conditions, we randomly set the order of the ingroup conditions (II, IV) and outgroup conditions (III, V). Consequently, each of the vaccinated and unvaccinated samples have eight groups.
Furthermore, to address potential order effects caused by successive participation in the dictator games in the within-analysis, we create a control group where we present the anonymous dictator game (I) five times. Totally, each of the vaccinated and unvaccinated samples have nine groups, including the control group. We explain more details in the attachment of the analysis plan.
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After
We conduct dictator game experiments in the following five conditions:
(I) Anonymous: A recipient is anonymous for an allocator. The allocator is also anonymous for the recipient.
(II) Private-Ingroup: An allocator is informed that a recipient belongs to the ingroup (a vaccinated individual in the vaccinated sample, or an unvaccinated individual in the unvaccinated sample). The allocator is also anonymous for the recipient.
(III) Private-Outgroup: An allocator is informed that a recipient belongs to the outgroup (an unvaccinated individual in the vaccinated sample, or a vaccinated individual in the unvaccinated sample). The allocator is also anonymous for the recipient.
(IV) Public-Ingroup: An allocator is informed that a recipient belongs to the ingroup. The recipient is notified of the vaccination status of the allocator.
(V) Public-Outgroup: An allocator is informed that a recipient belongs to the outgroup. The recipient is notified of the vaccination status of the allocator.
One subject participates in five dictator game experiments as an allocator. We randomly set the order of the above conditions to create eight groups in the vaccinated and unvaccinated samples, respectively. After we first present the dictator game in the Anonymous condition (I) in all the eight groups, we randomly set the order of the Private (II, III) and Public (IV, V) conditions. Then, within each of the Private and Public conditions, we randomly set the order of the ingroup conditions (II, IV) and outgroup conditions (III, V). Consequently, each of the vaccinated and unvaccinated samples have eight groups.
Furthermore, to address potential order effects caused by successive participation in the dictator games in the within-analysis, we create a control group where we present the anonymous dictator game (I) five times. Totally, each of the vaccinated and unvaccinated samples have nine groups, including the control group.
We explain more details in the attachment of the analysis plan.
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Field
Randomization Method
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Before
Stratified randomization by a survey company. The strata are based on age, gender, and generosity.
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After
Stratified randomization by a survey company. The strata are based on age, gender, and baseline generosity.
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