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Field
Abstract
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Before
In this paper, we study contract enforcement in the illegal gambling market of Pakistan as gamblers make high-stakes betting decisions without the state enforcing contracts. Our experimental intervention randomly assigns gamblers with book bets –a contract that allows them to pay back later—relative to pay upfront. We observe the pattern of repayment by gamblers in absence of any state authority enforcing these contracts. We also investigate two potential mechanisms 1) black-listing in case of nonpayment 2) threat or actual violence in case of non-payment. Finally, we examine the impact of a much-used decision aid, odds and historical data relevant to the bet, to investigate whether reducing uncertainty about the outcome affect the decision to bet. We observe winnings and losses of gamblers and collect rich set of behavioral data in the form of strategic dilemmas on risk, confidence, cooperation and coordination.
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After
In this paper, we study contract enforcement in the illegal gambling market of Pakistan as gamblers make high-stakes betting decisions without the state enforcing contracts. Our experimental intervention randomly assigns gamblers with additional week to honor their book bets –a contract that allows them to pay back the week after and to a treatment arm that makes blacklisting from betting market salient in the contract. We observe the pattern of repayment by gamblers in absence of any state authority enforcing these contracts. We also investigate two potential mechanisms 1) black-listing in case of nonpayment 2) threat or actual violence in case of non-payment. Finally, we examine the impact of a much-used decision aid, odds and historical data relevant to the bet, to investigate whether reducing uncertainty about the outcome affect the decision to bet. We observe winnings and losses of gamblers and collect rich set of behavioral data in the form of strategic dilemmas on risk, confidence, cooperation and coordination.
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Field
Last Published
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Before
March 07, 2022 02:36 PM
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After
April 20, 2022 04:50 PM
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Field
Intervention (Public)
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Before
T1: Sign a book bet contract with the gambler (an opportunity to pay back later in case of potential losses in a week)
T2: Coalition Salience – Sign a book bet contract with the gambler with black-listing clause added.
T3: Provide for free a decision aid containing odds and historical data relevant to bet provided for free
C: Status quo - upront payment and no decision-aid provided
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After
T1: Give an opportunity to sign a book bet contract with the gambler with additional time to payback (2 weeks to payback relative to status quo of one week repayment standard book bet contract)
T2: Coalition Salience – Black listing clause embedded within the status quo book bet contract of payment the week after
T3: Provide for free a decision aid containing odds and historical data relevant to bet embedded within the "handicap" decision aid
C: Status quo - Opportunity to place a book bet with the status quo contract allowing to payback a week after and no decision-aid provided
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Field
Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
winnings and losses of gamblers, self reported outcomes such as risk apetite, total losses returned to the casino.
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After
winnings and losses of gamblers, self reported outcomes such as risk appetite, total losses returned to the casino, total payments returned one week and two weeks after.
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Field
Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
We will randomly allocate 16000 gamblers at the Annual Lahore Race Derby into four groups of 4000 gamblers each:
T1: Sign a book bet contract with the gambler (an opportunity to pay back later in case of potential losses in a week)
T2: Coalition Salience – Sign a book bet contract with the gambler with black-listing clause added.
T3: Provide for free a decision aid containing odds and historical data relevant to bet provided for free
C: Status quo - upront payment and no decision-aid provided
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After
We will randomly allocate 16000 gamblers at the Annual Lahore Race Derby into four groups of 4000 gamblers each:
T1: Give an opportunity to sign a book bet contract with the gambler with additional time to payback (2 weeks to payback relative to status quo of one week repayment standard book bet contract)
T2: Coalition Salience – Black listing clause embedded within the status quo book bet contract of payment the week after
T3: Provide for free a decision aid containing odds and historical data relevant to bet embedded within the "handicap" decision aid
C: Status quo - Opportunity to place a book bet with the status quo contract allowing to payback a week after and no decision-aid provided
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