Field | Before | After |
---|---|---|
Field Study Withdrawn | Before | After No |
Field Intervention Completion Date | Before | After April 19, 2022 |
Field Data Collection Complete | Before | After Yes |
Field Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization) | Before | After 50 clusters/duoplies |
Field Was attrition correlated with treatment status? | Before | After No |
Field Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations | Before | After 100 subjects/firms |
Field Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms | Before | After 50 subjects/firms per treatment, 25 clusters/duoplies per treatment |
Field Public Data URL | Before | After https://osf.io/jnufw/ |
Field Is there a restricted access data set available on request? | Before | After No |
Field Program Files | Before | After Yes |
Field Program Files URL | Before | After https://osf.io/jnufw/ |
Field Data Collection Completion Date | Before | After April 19, 2022 |
Field Is data available for public use? | Before | After Yes |
Field | Before | After |
---|---|---|
Field Paper Abstract | Before | After Despite its empirical relevance, increasing returns to scale are understudied in experimental markets. We use Bertrand duopolies with increasing returns to examine the effects of two sharing rules on prices and collusive behavior: the symmetric rule (where each of the two firms that set the same price serves half of the market demand) and the winner-takes-all rule (where a fair randomization device decides which of the two firms serves the entire market). We hypothesized that market prices would be higher under the winner-takes-all rule because it provides a collusion mechanism that the symmetric rule does not. While we find that subjects under the winner-takes-all rule, as predicted, coordinate more than twice as often on one price compared to the symmetric sharing rule, we do not find that this increases market prices. This might be driven by the problem that subjects do not sufficiently coordinate on high prices. We report findings on alternation (an alternative collusion strategy) and intertemporal price adjustments in further analyses. |
Field Paper Citation | Before | After Andreas Orland (2022): "Sharing Rules in Bertrand Oligopolies with Increasing Returns," SSRN Working Paper 4273943. |
Field Paper URL | Before | After http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4273943 |