Abstract
Agent fraud harms mobile money systems through 1) a direct effect on defrauded consumers; and 2) an indirect effect where fear of fraud restricts usage and willingness to test new agents (Garz et al 2020). This pilot study addresses the latter effect through a lab study with mobile money consumers in Kenya and Uganda. It explores whether users, particularly women and older people, are willing to pay more to transact with agents they know and trust. It also tests whether anonymous customer ratings increase consumer willingness to visit unknown agents, and how this effect differs from the benchmark of referrals from a publicly-identified, known recommender. Finally, the study explores whether social stigmas about being scammed restrict public info sharing about fraudulent agents, which may help explain why fraudulent players are not competed out of the market. This project addresses a critical gap in our understanding of consumer preferences for public and non-public customer reviews, and tests a potential market-based solution to the growing problem of agent fraud.