Norm elicitations in dictator games and the prisoners' dilemma

Last registered on September 14, 2022

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Norm elicitations in dictator games and the prisoners' dilemma
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0009195
Initial registration date
April 07, 2022

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
April 11, 2022, 6:40 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
September 14, 2022, 12:57 PM EDT

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Stockholm School of Economics

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2022-04-08
End date
2022-10-01
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This preregistration presents the planned analyses for an experiment in which norms are elicited for two variations each of two commonly studied games: dictator games and the prisoners' dilemma (PD). The experiment addresses open questions in each game. See attached document for details.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Semb, Joakim. 2022. "Norm elicitations in dictator games and the prisoners' dilemma." AEA RCT Registry. September 14. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9195-1.1
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2022-04-08
Intervention End Date
2022-04-10

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Social appropriateness of cooperation (PD) and giving (dictator games) across treatment conditions: simultaneous vs. sequential PD facing cooperation; role-certain vs. role-uncertain dictator games; player vs. observer.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Krupka-Weber norm elicitations in two games: the prisoner's dilemma and binary dictator games. Dictator games varied along the role dimension: role certainty versus role uncertainty. PD varied along strategic certainty: either simultaneous-move, or second-mover facing cooperation. See attached document for details.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Computer
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
1000
Sample size: planned number of observations
1000
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
500 players; 500 observers. 500 simultaneous-move PD; 500 sequential. 500 role certainty; 500 role uncertainty. Independent randomization across these dimensions.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Analysis Plan

Analysis Plan Documents

KW_pap.pdf

MD5: 8e41a6d133c34a0d7aba94ea45a37b43

SHA1: c9b3e4b61dfbd83f67cca3aa4158ca2a260012cf

Uploaded At: April 07, 2022

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials