| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Trial Status | Before in_development | After completed |
| Field Last Published | Before July 22, 2022 03:32 PM | After March 26, 2026 03:56 AM |
| Field Study Withdrawn | Before | After No |
| Field Intervention Completion Date | Before | After July 15, 2022 |
| Field Data Collection Complete | Before | After Yes |
| Field Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations | Before | After 232 subjects |
| Field Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms | Before | After 116 pairs (55 in Baseline, 61 in Hidden Information). This was a failed replication attempt. New replication attempt (successful), followed by main study, was preregistered at https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11289. The present study is thus only reported in the appendix of the resulting paper. |
| Field Public Data URL | Before | After https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/XMW7T |
| Field Is there a restricted access data set available on request? | Before | After No |
| Field Program Files | Before | After No |
| Field Data Collection Completion Date | Before | After July 15, 2022 |
| Field Is data available for public use? | Before | After Yes |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Paper Abstract | Before | After Since ignorance can serve as an excuse for selfish behavior, people sometimes avoid learning about possible negative externalities of their actions. In social situations, however, others might provide the information anyway. How do potential informers affect willful ignorance and the resulting social outcomes? We introduce a third-party potential informer into the moral wiggle-room game. Almost half of the dictators avoided information only to have it imposed upon them by the informer. Most of these unwillingly-informed dictators revised their behavior to benefit the recipient, even at a cost to themselves. While knowledge of the informer’s presence did not change dictators’ propensity to seek information, a subtle change in the experimental choice interface did: The share of dictators choosing ignorance was more than halved when dictator’s ignorance and allocation choices were made in two separate decision screens rather than a single one. |
| Field Paper Citation | Before | After Grossman, Z., T. Hua, J.T. Lind, K. Nyborg (2026): Unwillingly informed: the prosocial impact of third-party informers, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (in press), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2026.103330. |
| Field Paper URL | Before | After https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2026.103330 |