Affect and Chauvinism in the Ultimatum Game

Last registered on April 29, 2022

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Affect and Chauvinism in the Ultimatum Game
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0009317
Initial registration date
April 26, 2022

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
April 29, 2022, 10:41 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Free University of Bolzano

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2023-04-03
End date
2023-06-02
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This study seeks to identify the role of affect in eliciting racially chauvinistic behavior on the Ultimatum Game (Güth et al., 1982). Existing studies show that some people, when in the UG’s receiver role, are more sensitive to unfair offers when these offers come from women or
racial minorities. We would utilize ultimatum offers from racially and ethnically diverse proposers to assess whether men in a non-WEIRD country behave similarly to those in the U.S., and, if so, whether certain affective primes impact their choices. Kuk (2019) used the
“economic insecurity” priming developed by Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir, and Zhao (2013) to elicit increased ethnocentrism among all participants and racial resentment among a subset, and we would use similar prompts to evaluate whether participants’ game play depends on
their “financial feelings.” Survey data from the same subjects may help explain greater or lesser tendencies toward chauvinistic behavior both in the control condition and when experiencing negative affect. We would also assess whether positive affect could ameliorate the behavior of people who might otherwise display racially chauvinistic play as the responder in the UG.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Couto da Silva, Rebecca. 2022. "Affect and Chauvinism in the Ultimatum Game." AEA RCT Registry. April 29. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9317
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2023-04-03
Intervention End Date
2023-06-02

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Whether the subjects are more sensitive to unfair offers when they come from racial minorities.
Whether positive or negative affect affects sensitivity to unfair offers from racial minorities.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Administer study via smartphone-adapted electronic means.

Proposers: Collect real Ultimatum Game (UG) offers from diverse proposers (if possible, collect offers from both immigrants and natives). Incentivize 2 rounds of play.

Responders: Collect demographic information and people's feelings about their own and the country's economic situations. Have them play 1 round of dictator game (DG) play with a randomized partner. Intersperse z-1 other rounds of DG play, each with a partner of a different ethnicity, into UG rounds. Have them play the UG as responders in x rounds, with y offers from z different ethnicities. Incentivize 2 rounds. If possible, have half of the responders respond to natives and half respond to immigrants.

Before play, prime responders. Have a control condition, economic security / insecurity conditions, and liberal / conservative political ad conditions (5 conditions total). Ask participants to identify valence and strength of post-prime affect and identify any emotions felt before and after game play.

Follow up 6 months later with social survey questions similar to those found on the ESS, WVS, or Latinobarometer. If possible, use previously obtained survey/panel data instead of the survey portions for as much of this step as possible. Measure implicit bias. Ask participants to predict how their economic situation will change due to the most recent elections and follow up in one year.

Ask participants to guess as to the purpose of the study and debrief.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization Unit
individual, experimental session
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
500 individuals
Sample size: planned number of observations
500 individuals
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
50 individuals control, non-immigrant proposers
50 individuals economic-insecurity prime, non-immigrant proposers
50 individuals economic-security prime, non-immigrant proposers
50 individuals liberal political ads, non-immigrant proposers
50 individuals conservative political ads, non-immigrant proposers
50 individuals control, immigrant proposers
50 individuals economic-insecurity prime, immigrant proposers
50 individuals economic-security prime, immigrant proposers
50 individuals liberal political ads, immigrant proposers
50 individuals conservative political ads, immigrant proposers
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number