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Fields Changed

Registration

Field Before After
Trial Status on_going completed
JEL Code(s) C93, D72, H11, H26
Last Published November 09, 2015 07:13 AM April 11, 2018 02:53 AM
Study Withdrawn No
Intervention Completion Date November 13, 2015
Data Collection Complete Yes
Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization) 600
Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations 600
Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms 200 control, 200 in each of the two treatments
Is there a restricted access data set available on request? Yes
Restricted Data Contact [email protected]
Program Files No
Data Collection Completion Date November 13, 2015
Is data available for public use? No
Additional Keyword(s) voting, participation, tax haven Elites, citizens, voter turnout, political participation, tax havens, political economy
Keyword(s) Electoral, Governance Electoral, Finance, Governance
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Papers

Field Before After
Paper Abstract We present results of a randomised field experiment where voters in Tanzania were given information about elite use of tax havens. Information provided in a neutral form had no effect, while information phrased in more morally charged terms led to a reduction in voting intentions. Rather than increase the perceived importance of voting, charged information tends to undermine confidence in political institutions and the social contract. The effects are particularly pronounced among the less well off, indicating that increased transparency in the absence of perceived agency may not improve political participation.
Paper Citation Ivar Kolstad & Arne Wiig (2018) How Does Information About Elite Tax Evasion Affect Political Participation: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania, The Journal of Development Studies, DOI: 10.1080/00220388.2018.1448067
Paper URL https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00220388.2018.1448067
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