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Field
Abstract
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Before
Group work is widely used in both business and education and could be leveraged to achieve a variety of goals. Weakest Link and Best Shot are incentive schemes that tie a group member’s compensation to the output of their group’s least and most productive member respectively. In this paper, we test the impact of these incentive schemes by conducting an RCT with graduate students in a math class. Students were placed in study groups of three or four students, and then groups were randomized to either control, Weakest Link, or Best Shot incentives. We find that Weakest Link incentives boosted a group’s lowest exam score relative to the Best Shot and control conditions, but only for the online section of the course. The Best Shot incentive boosted a group’s lowest exam score relative to control in both the online and in-person sections. We learn that incentives can impact groups differently online than in-person, and financial incentives can be leveraged to decrease inequity within a group’s performance in multiple ways.
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After
In organizations, teams are ubiquitous. “Weakest Link” and “Best Shot” are incentive schemes that tie a group member’s compensation to the output of their group’s least and most productive member, respectively. In this paper, we test the impact of these incentive schemes by conducting two pilot RCTs (one in-person, one online), which included more than 250 graduate students in a graduate math class. Students were placed in study groups of three or four students, and then groups were randomized to either control, Weakest Link, or Best Shot incentives. We find evidence that such incentive approaches can affect test scores, both in-person and online.
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