| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Last Published | Before July 26, 2023 08:40 PM | After July 26, 2023 08:53 PM |
| Field Intervention (Public) | Before We conduct an online field experiment operationalised through an online survey with around 1000 Ukrainian urban participants (mostly from Ukraine, some possibly temporarily relocated to other countries) aged 16 to 55, who were registered residents of all regions of Ukraine before the Russian invasion. Participants were randomly assigned to four treatment conditions which varied whether they were assigned a donor, and the identity of the donor. In the survey we observe their prosocial behaviour in the form of real donations to a humanitarian cause, and we also measure their preferences, reported prosocial behaviours through non-incentivised questions; we also collect individual characteristics. | After We conduct an online field experiment operationalised through an online survey with around 1000 Ukrainian urban participants (mostly from Ukraine, some possibly temporarily relocated to other countries) aged 16 to 55, who were registered residents of all regions of Ukraine before the Russian invasion. Participants were randomly assigned to four treatment conditions which varied whether they were assigned a donor, and the identity of the donor. In the survey we observe their prosocial behaviour in the form of real donations to a humanitarian cause, and we also measure their preferences, reported prosocial behaviours through non-incentivised questions; we also collect individual characteristics. We run a second wave of the online survey one year after the first survey and treatment, with the same participants ( 40% expected response rate). We collect long-term measures of prosociality, we reinforce the initial treatment (by giving the participants a reminder) and the prosocial behaviour measures from the initial survey. |
| Field Primary Outcomes (End Points) | Before Donations to a specified humanitrian cause | After Donations to a specified humanitarian cause. Recalled donations to any charity during one year preceding the second wave of the survey. |
| Field Primary Outcomes (Explanation) | Before Individuals were given a 70 UAH budget and they could decide how much to keep and how much to donate to a specified humanitarian cause. We will analyse the individual amount donated. | After Individuals were given a 70 UAH budget and they could decide how much to keep and how much to donate to a specified humanitarian cause. We will analyse the individual amount donated. Participants are asked to recall how much they have donated to charity since the first survey. |
| Field Experimental Design (Public) | Before In order to identify the causal effect of allies on prosocial choices, we use an online field experiment in which participants play a dictator game and we vary: 1) whether or not the participants are assigned a matching donor that will exactly match the amount donated by the participant. 2) the identity of the matching donor that will exactly match the amount donated by the participant, as shown in the table below: Control: no matching donor. Participants are not matched with a donor; no information is provided prior to the dictator game Treatment 1: national matching donor. “A generous Ukrainian donor has promised to donate an extra UAH for each UAH that you donate to the Emergency services in Ukraine.” Treatment 3: international matching donor. “A generous donor from a Western European country has promised to donate an extra UAH for each UAH that you donate to the Emergency services in Ukraine.” Treatment 4: unspecified matching donor. “A generous donor has promised to donate an extra UAH for each UAH that you donate to the Emergency services in Ukraine.” Participants are randomly allocated across treatment arms, with equal probability. | After In order to identify the causal effect of allies on prosocial choices, we use an online field experiment in which participants play a dictator game and we vary: 1) whether or not the participants are assigned a matching donor that will exactly match the amount donated by the participant. 2) the identity of the matching donor that will exactly match the amount donated by the participant, as shown in the table below: Control: no matching donor. Participants are not matched with a donor; no information is provided prior to the dictator game Treatment 1: national matching donor. “A generous Ukrainian donor has promised to donate an extra UAH for each UAH that you donate to the Emergency services in Ukraine.” Treatment 3: international matching donor. “A generous donor from a Western European country has promised to donate an extra UAH for each UAH that you donate to the Emergency services in Ukraine.” Treatment 4: unspecified matching donor. “A generous donor has promised to donate an extra UAH for each UAH that you donate to the Emergency services in Ukraine.” Participants are randomly allocated across treatment arms, with equal probability. Return participants in the second wave of the survey are reminded of their treatment in the first wave of the survey. |
| Field Planned Number of Observations | Before 1000 | After 1000 in wave 1 expected 400 in wave 2 |
| Field Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms | Before 250 | After 250 in wave 1 60-65 in wave 2 |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Document | Before |
After
pre-analysis plan_24072023 updated.pdf
MD5:
e99ba0f1fd637109496f510f4a1a2185
SHA1:
0f9ada0de7de78bee71cf4fe94a16d601567c4bc
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| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field IRB Name | Before | After University of East Anglia ECO-SREC |
| Field IRB Approval Date | Before | After June 20, 2023 |
| Field IRB Approval Number | Before | After ETH2223-2526 |