| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Last Published | Before February 22, 2023 09:03 AM | After August 02, 2024 08:12 AM |
| Field Study Withdrawn | Before | After No |
| Field Intervention Completion Date | Before | After June 29, 2022 |
| Field Data Collection Complete | Before | After Yes |
| Field Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization) | Before | After 194 |
| Field Was attrition correlated with treatment status? | Before | After No |
| Field Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations | Before | After 194 |
| Field Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms | Before | After 194 |
| Field Public Data URL | Before | After https://osf.io/8us67/ |
| Field Is there a restricted access data set available on request? | Before | After No |
| Field Program Files | Before | After Yes |
| Field Program Files URL | Before | After https://osf.io/8us67/ |
| Field Data Collection Completion Date | Before | After June 29, 2022 |
| Field Is data available for public use? | Before | After Yes |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Paper Abstract | Before | After We experimentally examine how the incentive to defect in a social dilemma affects conditional cooperation. In our first study we conduct online experiments in which subjects play eight Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma games with payoffs systematically varied across games. We find that few second movers are conditionally cooperative (i.e., cooperate if and only if the first mover cooperates) in all eight games. Instead, most second-movers change strategies between games. The rate of conditional cooperation is higher when the own gain from defecting is lower and when the loss imposed on the first mover from defecting is higher. This pattern is consistent with both social preference models and stochastic choice models. To explore which model explains our findings we employ a second study to jointly estimate noise and social preference parameters at the individual level. The majority of our subjects place significantly positive weight on others’ payoffs, supporting the underlying role of social preferences in conditional cooperation. |
| Field Paper Citation | Before | After Baader, M., Gächter, S., Lee, K., & Sefton, M. (2022). Social Preferences and the Variability of Conditional Cooperation. |
| Field Paper URL | Before | After https://www.cesifo.org/en/publications/2022/working-paper/social-preferences-and-variability-conditional-cooperation |