Performance Incentives to Local Politicians in South India

Last registered on June 06, 2022

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Performance Incentives to Local Politicians in South India
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0009543
Initial registration date
June 03, 2022

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
June 06, 2022, 5:53 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2013-01-01
End date
2022-08-01
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Despite growing awareness of various failures of electoral democracy, there is a relative lack of evidence on effective policy interventions to improve the performance of elected officials and motivate them to act more equitably. We conducted an experiment where we randomly assigned elected presidents of village governments in Tamil Nadu, India to one of two incentive schemes (or a control group); a financial incentive that rewards better-performing presidents with a higher public budget, and a non-financial incentive which awards them a certificate demonstrating their achievement with an information campaign to disseminate it. We measure the effectiveness of these incentives on their overall performance in the delivery of public goods and private transfer schemes, as well as the equity effects on the targeting of these programs within their village.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Shrestha, Slesh. 2022. "Performance Incentives to Local Politicians in South India." AEA RCT Registry. June 06. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9543
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2013-04-01
Intervention End Date
2015-07-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
- Overall performance of GP Presidents based on PVP project evaluation criteria
- Improved access to main private transfer schemes available in the GP president at the time of the evaluation (based on PVP project evluation data)
- Improved targetting of key public infrastructure programs within the GP (based on PVP project evaluation data)
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Recently elected Gram Panchayat presidents were assigned to one of two performance-based incentive schemes with a public reward (or to a control group). A financial incentive rewards better-performing presidents with a higher public budget, and a non-financial incentive awards them a certificate demonstrating their achievement with an information campaign to disseminate it.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization was done in the office by a computer
Randomization Unit
Gram Panchayat (GP)
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
198 GPs
Sample size: planned number of observations
198 GPs
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
64 control GPs, 67 financial incentive GPs, 67 nonfinancial incentive GPs
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials