Competitive equilibrium and the double auction

Last registered on June 06, 2022

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Competitive equilibrium and the double auction
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0009547
Initial registration date
June 05, 2022

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
June 06, 2022, 5:57 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Sciences Po & Paris School of Economics

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2022-06-05
End date
2022-06-12
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
In this project, I revisit the hypothesis that double auctions generate competitive equilibrium prices.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Rasooly, Itzhak. 2022. "Competitive equilibrium and the double auction." AEA RCT Registry. June 06. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9547-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention (Hidden)
There are two main experimental treatments. In treatment 1, buyer valuations are £12, £32, £52, £72, £92; and seller costs are £8, £28, £48, £68, £88. Meanwhile, in treatment 2, buyer valuations are £0, £0, £52, £52, £52; and seller costs are £0, £0, £48, £52, £52. As can be seen, treatment 2 shifts valuations and costs downwards but in a way that leaves the set of competitive equilibrium prices unchanged.

There are two versions of these treatments. In the first version, there is a queue of buyers and sellers who join the market following trades in just the way necessary to keep the supply and demand correspondences fixed over time. In the second version, buyers and sellers drop out of the market without replacement as trade progresses.

Please see the participant instructions for more information about the treatments.
Intervention Start Date
2022-06-05
Intervention End Date
2022-06-12

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
The observed prices
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
See previous section
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
N/A
Randomization Unit
N/A
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
N/A
Sample size: planned number of observations
I plan to have 5 active buyers and 5 active sellers. In the treatments with queues, I plan to have a further 8 participants (half buyers and half sellers).
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
In total, the treatments will involve 2 x 10 + 2 x 18 = 56 participants.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
University of Oxford
IRB Approval Date
2022-05-04
IRB Approval Number
ECONCIA21-22-44

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials