We will conduct an incentivized survey experiment with the objectives of indirectly eliciting individuals’ willingness to pay to receive and to share productivity-enhancing information and of identifying how this willingness changes when social norms are breached.
We will first stratify based on factory, production unit, high vs. low productivity, sex, tenure, education level, and age. We may not be able to use all variables in all factories if the strata that result are too small. Within strata, we will randomly assign workers to the “Sender” condition or to the “Receiver” condition. Senders are the workers who are randomly assigned to imagine that they receive training. Their prompt will entail an invitation to participate in information-sharing sessions in which they teach workers who have not participated in training. Receivers are the workers who are randomly to imagine that they are not selected to participate in training. Their prompt will entail an invitation to participate in information-sharing sessions in which they are taught new skills by workers who received training. The survey experiment will occur prior to announcement of which workers have been selected to participate in the training.
Within strata and condition (Sender/receiver), for the information sharing sessions, workers will be randomly assigned to be matched with another worker who is (1) anonymous; (2) high status; or (3) low status. We consider social status related to sex (men vs women), age (older vs younger), and religion (Muslim vs non-Muslim); where the higher status group is always listed first. We may not be able to use all dimensions of social status in all factories if the number of particular groups is too low. In the experiment, workers will not receive information about their partner’s identity, only their type. The anonymous condition identifies baseline take-up rates. Within strata and condition (sender/receiver x match type), workers will be randomly assigned to be informed that their decision will be made public or will be kept private.
In the experiment, workers will be read the experimental prompt, which is tailored to their treatment assignment. In the prompt, workers will be invited to participate in the information sharing session and informed about the type of worker whom they are matched with and whether their decision to participate will be public (private). The survey enumerator will then elicit workers’ willingness to pay (receivers) or to accept (senders) to participate in the sessions using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) method.
During experiment 1, workers will also complete other survey modules.
We will conduct a skills training experiment in which we randomly assign a subset of either high or low status workers in a linking production unit to 2 days of technical skills training. We will then use this exogenous variation in worker training to study to what extent diffusion of new knowledge in the workplace depends on workers’ social status.
We will first stratify based on factory, the production unit’s quantile in the productivity distribution, and the production unit’s quantile in the distribution of sub-sections by the share of low types among those eligible for training. We may not be able to use all variables in all factories if the resulting stratas are too small. Within strata, we will randomly assign production units to either have a random subset of high types or a random subset of low types trained. We anticipate training 20-30% of workers in each subsection, but ultimately, the share will depend on the numbers of eligible workers and take-up of the training. The training entails two days of technical skills training. The technical skills training curriculum will be tailored to each factory’s needs based on a diagnostic conducted by a team of industrial engineers. The training will be conducted on two consecutive Fridays. Incentivized skills tests will be administered at the beginning and the end of each day of training.
In the week before the first training, in the week after the second training, and approximately three weeks after the second training, a trained assessor will visit the factory and will observe adoption of the skills taught during the training by all workers in the linking section. If relevant, they will also observe adoption of housekeeping tools.
In the third week after the second skills training session, an endline survey will be conducted with workers in the linking section. Individual-level production data will be collected for several months prior to the training intervention and for multiple weeks following it. The research team will measure coworkers’ awareness of the technical skills taught during the training sessions, coworkers’ adoption of these skills, and coworkers’ productivity.
At factories where industrial engineers deem poor housekeeping to hinder production quality, the training will include housekeeping techniques. On the second day of training, workers will be provided with tools needed to maintain good housekeeping (e.g., small baskets to store certain materials). Workers will be encouraged but not required to use these materials at their workstations. They will also be endowed with 4 vouchers for baskets that they can provide to their coworkers. Their coworkers can use the vouchers to collect these materials from a member of the management team who will make them available at their office. Given the staggered nature of the project’s role-out to factories, it is difficult to assess how many factories will be eligible for this intervention ahead of time.