x

Please fill out this short user survey of only 3 questions in order to help us improve the site. We appreciate your feedback!
Pay for Performance – Evidence from a large discount retailer
Last registered on November 18, 2015

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Pay for Performance – Evidence from a large discount retailer
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0000961
Initial registration date
November 18, 2015
Last updated
November 18, 2015 9:53 AM EST
Location(s)
Region
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
University of Cologne
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
University of Applied Science Neuss
PI Affiliation
University of Cologne
Additional Trial Information
Status
On going
Start date
2015-01-01
End date
2016-12-31
Secondary IDs
Abstract
Within a large retail discounter we monetarily incentivize a key performance variable, the normalized average receipt, for a randomly assigned set of middle (district) managers in one region. As a robustness check we used a different region in which we do almost the same procedure and intervention but without a monetary incentive. The middle management of this region receives a kick-off mail stating that the focus should be on the performance of the average receipt for the next months and they receive an additional feedback about their performance each month. This allows us to control whether a change in the performance is due to the monetary incentive or due to salience of the performance.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Manthei, Kathrin, Dirk Sliwka and Timo Vogelsang. 2015. "Pay for Performance – Evidence from a large discount retailer." AEA RCT Registry. November 18. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.961-1.0.
Former Citation
Manthei, Kathrin et al. 2015. "Pay for Performance – Evidence from a large discount retailer." AEA RCT Registry. November 18. http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/961/history/6078.
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2015-11-02
Intervention End Date
2016-01-29
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Among many: the change of the key performance indicator (avg. receipt), order behavior of managers, food expiration, FTEs, mystery shopping results, questionnaire
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
The intervention takes place in two regions of Germany. We randomly assign managers within each region to either the treatment (1) or control group (2) using the stratification method by Thomas Barrios (2013).

Region 1 (monetary incentive):

T1-1: Middle (district) management attended a kick-off event, receives a monthly notification concerning their performance of the key performance variable (average receipt normalized) and get €100 for each percentage point increase of this variable.
T1-2: Middle (district) management receives nothing except a notification that they will get a bonus for the increase of some other (at this point unknown) variable at a later stage (after this intervention).


Region 2 (salience):

T2-1: Middle (district) management receives a kick-off email and monthly notification concerning their performance of the key performance variable (average receipt normalized).
T2-2: Middle (district) management receives nothing.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Stratification method by Thomas Barrios (2013)
Randomization Unit
District Managers
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
49
Sample size: planned number of observations
Bonus treatment: approx. 304 shop managers; Salience treatment: approx. 256 shop managers
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
(we are not sure about the exact number of shop managers at the stage of registration because the discounter wants to drop shops which do not exist for at least 3 years and shops which have been reconstructed this year. Unfortunately, we haven’t received this information yet)

Bonus treatment: 25 district managers
Salience treatment: 17 district managers
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Post-Trial
Post Trial Information
Study Withdrawal
Intervention
Is the intervention completed?
No
Is data collection complete?
Data Publication
Data Publication
Is public data available?
No
Program Files
Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials
Relevant Paper(s)
REPORTS & OTHER MATERIALS