AEA RCT Registry

Trial Information

General Information

Title

Effort and Morals in Markets

RCT ID

AEARCTR-0009626

Initial registration date

June 21, 2022

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published

June 26, 2022, 5:22 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated

December 15, 2022, 9:21 AM EST

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Country

Germany

Region

Hamburg

Primary Investigator

Name

Andreas Lange

Affiliation

University of Hamburg

Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name

Christian Schmitz

PI Affiliation

University of Hamburg

Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status

In development

Start date

2022-06-21

End date

2023-03-31

Keywords

Behavior, Lab

Additional Keywords

moral behavior, bad conscience, real-effort task, donation

JEL code(s)

C91;D64

Secondary IDs

Prior work

This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.

Abstract

Understanding moral behavior in different market contexts and the effect of such behavior on giving. We consider the dynamics of moral decision making. Individuals may change their moral stands over a sequence of choices. Specifically, they have a choice between two technologies when conducting a real-effort task, with one giving a higher personal return, but a smaller social payoff (reduces a donation pool). Following the real effort task, subjects can donate under varying information and competition conditions. We are interested in learning to what extent these conditions affect (i) the initial choice of the technology, and (ii) the subsequent donation decisions.
We add to the literature on mora behavior in markets. We provide a more realistic experimental environment that is inspired by charitable giving, e.g. via foundations, that often follows market activities that generate private incomes (fortunes), but may have had negative externalities. By varying the observability of individual actions as well as by varying the competitiveness in the initial money-earning stage, we are able to identify the underlying motivational mechanisms that govern moral/immoral behavior.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation

Lange, Andreas and Christian Schmitz. 2022. "Effort and Morals in Markets." AEA RCT Registry. December 15. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9626-2.0

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

This experiment will be conducted as an online experiment of the experimental laboratory of the University of Hamburg. The experiment will combine a real-effort task and a subsequent donation option. Two technologies are available: one give a larger personal payoffs than the other but leads to a deduction from a charity pool. We conduct a baseline and 2x3 treatments (EXO_A: exogenous technology A; EXO_B: exogenous technology B. T1: endogenous choice of technology; T2: endogenous choice of technology with observer, info only on final donation; T3: endogenous choice of technology with observer, info on technology choice and final donation. T4-T6 repeat T1-T3, but introduce a competitive element in which two participants are matched and a bonus payment is made to the one with the highest personal earnings in the real-effort task.
In the observer treatments, an observer is grading 6 participants. Participants know that they will receive feedback at the end of the experiment on their own grade and the average grade given to the 5 other participants.

Intervention Start Date

2022-06-21

Intervention End Date

2023-03-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)

initial choice of technology, the effort (completed decoding tasks), as well as on the final voluntary contributions

Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)

Grades given by observer

Exploratoiry use of control variables from a short questionnaire at the end of the survey: Demographic variables (gender, subject of study, political preference, donation outside the lab)

Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

This experiment will be conducted as an online experiment of the experimental laboratory of the University of Hamburg. The experiment will combine a real-effort task and a subsequent donation option. Two technologies are available: one give a larger personal payoffs than the other but leads to a deduction from a charity pool. We conduct a baseline and 2x3 treatments (EXO_A: exogenous technology A; EXO_B: exogenous technology B. T1: endogenous choice of technology; T2: endogenous choice of technology with observer, info only on final donation; T3: endogenous choice of technology with observer, info on technology choice and final donation. T4-T6 repeat T1-T3, but introduce a competitive element in which two participants are matched and a bonus payment is made to the one with the highest personal earnings in the real-effort task.
In the observer treatments, an observer is grading 6 participants. Participants know that they will receive feedback at the end of the experiment on their own grade and the average grade given to the 5 other participants.

Experimental Design Details

Randomization Method

Randomization done in office by a computer

Randomization Unit

Individual

Was the treatment clustered?

No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters

260 in initial phase, collected within Master thesis phase (initially registered), later roll-out to the full sample of 520-600 participants

Sample size: planned number of observations

8x60=480 plus 4x10 observer. Planned Number of Observations: In all treatments, we have at least 60 subjects. In the observer treatments, we have additional 5 subjects who evaluate the performance of 6 subjects each

Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms

Planned Number of Observations: In all treatments, we have 60 subjects. In the observer treatments, we have additional 10 subjects who evaluate the performance of 6 subjects each.

Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)

Supporting Documents and Materials

IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name

IRB Approval Date

IRB Approval Number

Analysis Plan

Effort and Morals in Markets

Pre-Trial

General Information

Locations

Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Registration Citation

Interventions

Primary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes

Experimental Design

Experiment Characteristics

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

Post-Trial

Study Withdrawal

Intervention

Data Publication

Program Files

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials