Procedural fairness and externalities under uncertainty

Last registered on October 19, 2022

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Procedural fairness and externalities under uncertainty
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0009701
Initial registration date
July 05, 2022

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
July 08, 2022, 9:45 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
October 19, 2022, 3:30 PM EDT

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
King's College London

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2022-07-07
End date
2022-07-17
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Many decisions people make have the potential to create positive externalities. This is especially the case for decisions that are made under uncertainty: Starting a business, developing new technologies, or investing into new ventures, are all decisions that involve uncertainty about personal gains and losses, but have potential positive externalities for wider society. For example, a successful entrepreneur may create jobs, knowledge spillovers, or improve welfare through her products and services. The likelihood of a person choosing such entrepreneurial activities is however affected by whether and how societies reward this decision. One channel that may affect such rewards are individuals’ distributive preferences. If individuals hold a preference to reward risk takers who create positive externalities for society, then this creates demand for policies in line with such preferences. How potential externalities affect distributive preferences is however an open question. In this study, I will provide a theoretical framework and a first experimental test of how potential externalities affect distributive preferences when income is earned under uncertainty.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Weber, Nina. 2022. "Procedural fairness and externalities under uncertainty." AEA RCT Registry. October 19. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9701-1.1
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2022-07-07
Intervention End Date
2022-07-17

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Spectator allocation decision
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
My basic experimental design follows in particular Cappelen et al. (2013) by asking an impartial spectator to decide on a fair allocation of a monetary bonus between two decision makers. Prior to spectators making their distributive choice, decision makers have to choose between a lottery and a safe income. In the treatment condition, choosing the lottery does not just yield a potentially high reward for the decision maker if successful, but might also result in positive externalities for the participant pool.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization is done automatically by the software.
Randomization Unit
Individual-level randomization into treatment and control groups.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
n/a
Sample size: planned number of observations
A total of 3600 spectator decisions across one control and two treatment groups
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
360 decision makers and 180 spectators
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
see pre-analysis plan
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
King's College London
IRB Approval Date
2022-05-10
IRB Approval Number
MRSP-21/22-30100
Analysis Plan

Analysis Plan Documents

Fairness_and_Externalities_PAP_0507

MD5: f6a02c75cc448e4a4f746a9e6ab3e469

SHA1: 8752fe1b5bec7eaa48e07c277b6f5781b88ebffd

Uploaded At: July 05, 2022

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials