Migrant's Integration and Voting Behavior

Last registered on August 03, 2022

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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title

Migrant's Integration and Voting Behavior

RCT ID

AEARCTR-0009806

Initial registration date

July 28, 2022

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published

August 03, 2022, 2:13 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country

Colombia

Region

Bogotá

Primary Investigator

Name

Alejandra Quintana

Affiliation

World Bank Group

Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name

Sandra Rozo

PI Affiliation

World Bank Group

Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status

In development

Start date

2022-08-01

End date

2022-10-31

Keywords

Behavior, Electoral, Other

Additional Keywords

Migration, Social Capital, Amnesties

JEL code(s)

D72, F02, F22, O15, R23

Secondary IDs

Prior work

This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.

Abstract

The alarming magnitude of forced migrant flows, which reached at least 84 million people by mid-2021, has opened a strong debate on how to effectively support displaced populations. Often times host government decisions are based on popular beliefs about the possible impacts of refugee’s economic integration. For example, politicians who observe the sharp increments in xenophobia and resentment towards migrants from the general public could be frightened that the electorate will punish them and their parties if they have a political platform that is more favorable towards migrants.This research project aims to inform this debate by examining the effects of a large-scale regularization program, the Permiso Especial de Permanencia (PEP), which granted working rights and access to safety nets to nearly 281,000 Venezuelan refugees in Colombia in August 2018.

For this purpose, mayoral electoral results are compared between municipalities with higher and lower program take-up rates, before and after the program roll-out in 2018. The regularization had negligible impacts in electoral outcomes, attitudes towards migrants. Mover over, since PEP is a national policy, we found empirical evidence that supports that the electorate did not change their political behavior in the presidential elections. The analysis is also enriched by exploiting the Survey of Political Culture -a unique and novel survey collected in 2019- by the Dane, the Colombian statistics agency, in order to characterize attitudes towards migrants and prosocial behaviors in Colombia. Given there is only one wave of the survey, the data only enabled the exploration of correlations between the PEP program take-up rates and social capital outcomes. The analysis, of this data, confirms that the correlation between the PEP take-up rates and social capital outcomes as well as attitudes towards migrants is close to zero.

How can local communities show no response to the regularization program in their voting behaviors, attitudes towards migrants, and prosocial behaviors? There are multiple potential explanations. For example, it is possible that voters do not follow closely the policies that regulate refugee’s labor rights. In fact, internet searches of residence and work permits granted by the Colombian government to Venezuelan refugees are search terms that Colombians do not use often (Santamaria, 2020). It is also feasible that the effect of immigration on Colombians voting behaviors is predominantly driven by voter’s concern on the overall economic impacts of migrants when they first arrive, as shown by Rozo and Vargas (2021), but not by subsequent policies that support them. If this is the case, voters will not be concerned about the effects of those refugees who are already in Colombia and changed their labor right status with the regularization program.

To test the mechanisms behind the negligible effects of the PEP program, we survey 1040 Colombian adults residents of Bogotá on their knowledge of the regularization pro- gram, voting behaviors and attitudes toward the refugee population. The survey will also include Survey-experiment to assess the effect of having information on the PEP program: half of the individuals will be randomly allocated to an information experiment in which they will be informed about the PEP regularization program and subsequently we will monitor the effects of receiving these information on their voting intentions and attitudes towards Venezuelan outcomes.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation

Quintana, Alejandra and Sandra Rozo. 2022. "Migrant's Integration and Voting Behavior." AEA RCT Registry. August 03. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9806-1.0

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

We will collect a sample that is representative of Colombian adults in Bogota. Especially, we will interview around 1040 residents of Bogotá, who are Colombian born citizens and who were over 18 years old in 2019, on their knowledge of the regularization program, voting behavior, social capital and attitudes towards the migrant population.

Intervention (Hidden)

Intervention Start Date

2022-08-01

Intervention End Date

2022-10-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)

First, the survey will give us statistic evidence that support if Colombians are aware and have knowledge of the government's migratory regulation.
Voting intentions, positive and negative reciprocity, attitudes towards migrants, and Political attitudes towards migrants’ integration policies

Primary Outcomes (explanation)

I.Voting intentions: we will identified people who intend to vote in the next mayoral election in 2023 and in the presidential election in 2026.
II.Social Capital, based on Falk et al. (2018):
IIA. Positive Reciprocity.
1. (Self-assessment:) When someone does me a favor I am willing to return it.
2. (hypothetical situation:) Please think about what you would do in the following situation. You are lost in an unknown area of the city you live in. You ask a stranger for guidance. The stranger offers you a ride to your destination. Helping you costs the stranger about 6,000 Colombian pesos in total. However, the stranger says he does not want you to give him the money. You have six gifts. The cheapest gift costs 1,500 Colombian pesos and the most expensive one costs 9,000 Colombian pesos. would you give the stranger one of the gifts as a thank you? If so, which present do you give to the stranger?
IIB. Negative Reciprocity, create an index with the following information of the survey.
(Willingness to act:) How willing you are to punish someone who treats you unfairly, even when there are risks to you of personal consequences?
(Willingness to act:) How willing are you to punish someone who treats others (emphasis on others) unfairly, even when there are risks to you of personal consequences?
(Willingness to act:) If I am treated very unfairly, I will take revenge on the first occasion, even if I have to pay a cost for it.
III. Attitudes towards migrants
III.A.Altruism:
(Experimental situation:) At the end of this survey you will receive 5,000 Colombian pesos. You can keep the money or donate it to the church for the following causes. It is important to clarify that the church only accepts round amounts, therefore, only multiples of 500 can be deposited. How do you want to distribute the money between? You/ To the Church to support the vulnerable population of Venezuelan migrant./To the Church to support the vulnerable population of Colombians.
(Willingnesstoact:) How willing are you to donate to charitable causes without expecting anything in return?
*IIIB.Trust
(Self-assessment:) I always assume that people have only the best intentions.
IV. Political attitudes towards migrants': We will calculate if people are supportive of open policies for a rapid social and economic incorporation of migrants
(Self-assessment:) 1) Colombian government is obliged to help Venezuelan migrants.
(Self-assessment:) 2) Would vote for a policy to increase government spending to help Venezuelan migrants. |
(Self-assessment:) 3) Venezuelan migrants come to compete for our jobs.
(Self-assessment:) 4) Venezuelan migrants increase crime.
Finally, we will asked if the total effect of migrants, especially Venezuelan migrants in Colombia is positive/negative/both/neither.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)

Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Half of respondents will be randomly allocated to an information experiments in which they will be informed about the regularization program of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia. On one hand the treatment group will be given a brochure with facts on how many Venezuelan have been displaced from their country and how many lived in Colombia, how many of them are recipients of the PEP regularization program, and the benefits they have. On the other hand, the control group will be given a brochure informing ONLY how many Venezuelan have been displaced from their country and how many lived in Colombia.

Experimental Design Details

The survey includes a social desirability index and a list experiment. Below is a list of the information that will be collected in the survey:
The instrument has around 37 questions and the following structure:
1.Basic socio-demographic information
2. Social desirability:
(i) List experiment and (ii) The Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale.
3. Experiment
4.Attitudes towards migrants (trust and altruism)
5.Political attitudes towards migrants’ integration policies and voting intentions
6.General knowledge about PEP

Randomization Method

We will use the "negative coordinate" algorithm, one of the most commonly used algorithms for selecting a simple random sample of statistical units. We will follow the following steps:
(a) to each sample unit assign a random number between "0" and "1"
(b) set the random values generated.
(c) sort the units in ascending order according to the number generated within each stratum.
(d) In each stratum take the first "n" units, where "n" is the sample size assigned to that stratum.

Randomization Unit

Individuals

Was the treatment clustered?

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters

Sample of Colombian adults residents of Bogota, who were over 18 years old in 2019. A presentative sample of 1040 people is contemplated, representative for three socioeconomic level (low, middle, and high) and for two age groups (22 to 30 years old and 31 years old and older). The survey will include a survey-experiment to assess the effect of having information on the PEP program: half of respondents will be randomly allocated to an information experiments in which they will be informed about the regularization program of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia

Sample size: planned number of observations

1040 individuals

Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms

520 individuals control and 520 individuals in treatment. Both groups will be sub-divided into three socio-economic stratums (173 individual of low, 173 of middle, and 174 of high income households) and two age groups (260 people 22 to 30 years old and 260 people 31 years old and older).

Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)

In general, the sample size was selected to be able to detect a difference of 2% in attitudes towards Venezuelan between treatment and control groups and will be collected in-person.

Supporting Documents and Materials

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