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Fairness preferences when facing limited information
Last registered on April 04, 2016

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Fairness preferences when facing limited information
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0001151
Initial registration date
April 04, 2016
Last updated
April 04, 2016 9:32 AM EDT
Location(s)
Region
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
The Norwegian School of Economics
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
The Norwegian school of economics
PI Affiliation
The Norwegian school of economics
PI Affiliation
The Norwegian school of economics
Additional Trial Information
Status
In development
Start date
2016-04-04
End date
2017-04-04
Secondary IDs
Abstract
Recent experimental studies show that behavior in distributional situations can be traced back to a variety of fairness ideals and that the majority of people can be characterized as meritocrats distinguishing between personal factors (effort and talent) and impersonal factors (luck) when it comes to the attribution of responsibility for an outcome. However, in many situations the extend to which an achievement is determined by an individual's performance or luck is not directly observable and often remains unknown. In this project, we therefore aim to answer the following research question: What happens to people's willingness to redistribute earnings if there exists uncertainty about the role of luck and merit in the production of these earnings?
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Bonn, Caroline et al. 2016. "Fairness preferences when facing limited information." AEA RCT Registry. April 04. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1151-1.0.
Former Citation
Bonn, Caroline et al. 2016. "Fairness preferences when facing limited information." AEA RCT Registry. April 04. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1151/history/7487.
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2016-04-04
Intervention End Date
2017-04-04
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
In all situations two workers have earned money by conducting a real effort task. The main dependent variable is how the participants choose to distribute the production value between two workers. Subsidiary we study the beliefs about other participants performance.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
The experiment has two parts. In the first part, the production phase, the workers perform a real-effort task to earn points. Each worker's production depends both on the worker's performance in the real-effort task as well as a random factor that cannot be in influenced by the
worker. In the second part, the distribution phase, two workers will be randomly matched and it will be determined how the sum of their production - their total production - is divided between them. In our study we focus both on distribution decisions by one of the workers, being a 'stakeholder', as well as distribution decisions made by an impartial third party, the 'spectator'.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization is done by a computer
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
No clusters
Sample size: planned number of observations
450 individuals
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Between 110 and 115 individuals in each of the four treatments arms.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Post-Trial
Post Trial Information
Study Withdrawal
Intervention
Is the intervention completed?
No
Is data collection complete?
Data Publication
Data Publication
Is public data available?
No
Program Files
Program Files
Reports and Papers
Preliminary Reports
Relevant Papers