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Electoral Promises in the Philippines
Last registered on May 05, 2016

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Electoral Promises in the Philippines
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0001210
Initial registration date
May 05, 2016
Last updated
May 05, 2016 9:27 PM EDT
Location(s)
Region
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
University of British Columbia
PI Affiliation
University of British Columbia
PI Affiliation
Inter-American Development Bank
Additional Trial Information
Status
On going
Start date
2016-03-02
End date
2016-12-01
Secondary IDs
Abstract
This project focuses on electoral promises and their impacts in municipal elections of the Philippines. The core of the project - conducted in collaboration with the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting - relies on conducting an informational treatment in the context of the 2016 mayoral elections in the Ilocos Sur and Ilocos Norte regions of the country. We followed a similar approach in trial AEARCTR-0000688 which studied the 2013 elections, research upon which this project builds. Voters in randomly selected villages will receive information on the promises of candidates running in the 2016 elections and a random subset of them will also be reminded of the promises made by candidates ahead of the 2013 elections.

The project seeks to answer questions such as:
1. What are the effects of repeated promises on voter and candidate behavior, including vote buying?
2. How does incumbent compliance with past promises influence voter reactions to new promises?
3. How do promises and their effects vary with the strength of incumbents?

We will also estimate key parameters of a structural model of vote choice based on elicitation of voters beliefs and heterogenous preferences for policy. In addition, we will be able to run some counterfactual simulations, including, but not limited to:
1. What would have happened to the elections without electoral promises?
2. What would have happened to the elections without vote buying?
3. What would have been the effects of the intervention if candidates were unable to buy votes?
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Cruz, Cesi et al. 2016. "Electoral Promises in the Philippines ." AEA RCT Registry. May 05. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1210-1.0.
Former Citation
Cruz, Cesi et al. 2016. "Electoral Promises in the Philippines ." AEA RCT Registry. May 05. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1210/history/8123.
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2016-05-03
Intervention End Date
2016-05-08
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Key outcome variables are: Beliefs about candidate promises, salience of local development spending on voting decisions, vote share and vote buying.

In addition, as a long-term outcome of trial AEARCTR-0000688 we will also collect data on public goods provision at the village level between 2013 and 2016.

The survey instruments will also include a module necessary to estimate the structural model. It is designed to elicit voters' beliefs about proposed spending by the top 3 candidates.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
The electoral treatments include willingly disclosed campaign promises on the part of incumbent and challengers in each race. The set of campaign promises includes the 2016 policy promises and the policy promises made at the previous electoral round in 2013. An example of the 2013 flyer is attached. The 2016 flyers will follow a similar design.

The sample will be divided into three groups:
(a). Treatment 1: Receive two flyers (i) the promises made by candidates running in the 2016 mayoral elections and, (ii) the promises made by the candidates in 2013
(b). Treatment 2: Receive a flyer with the promises made by candidates running in the 2016 mayoral elections.
(c). Control: do not receive any flyer.

The flyers will be distributed through door-to-door visits a few days before the elections.


Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
The randomization was done using a Stata code.
Randomization Unit
Randomisation was done at the village-level.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
The sample will include 158 villages in 7 of the 12 municipalities where the experiment was carried out in 2013. In the other 5 municipalities the incumbent is running unopposed in 2016.

Sample size: planned number of observations
We expect to interview 22 households per village for a total sample size of 3,476 households.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
The villages will be allocated as follows: 54 Treatment 1 villages, 50 Treatment 2 villages and 54 control villages.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

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IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
University of British Columbia
IRB Approval Date
2016-03-02
IRB Approval Number
H16-00502
IRB Name
National University of Singapore
IRB Approval Date
2016-04-21
IRB Approval Number
A-16-081
Post-Trial
Post Trial Information
Study Withdrawal
Intervention
Is the intervention completed?
No
Is data collection complete?
Data Publication
Data Publication
Is public data available?
No
Program Files
Program Files
Reports and Papers
Preliminary Reports
Relevant Papers