Abstract
Transitioning towards a more sustainable agriculture is essential for ensuring future food production (Corbeels et al., 2020; Garnett et al., 2013; Mueller et al., 2012; Pretty et al., 2011). Sustainable cropping systems yield greater benefits when implemented on a larger scale: this necessitates coordination between farmers. Thus, a policy that fosters coordination among farmers can be economically justified, as it is likely to generate more public goods per dollar invested.
This study investigates the effectiveness and efficiency of different incentive mechanisms to promote farmers’ adoption of sustainable cropping systems in Zimbabwe. The analysis considers financial incentives as a potential policy tool to enhance both the adoption and the coordination among farmers. These mechanisms are tested in a lab-in-the-field setting in rural Zimbabwe with smallholder farmers.
Our research explores the effectiveness of two types of financial incentives: individual-based and collective-based incentives. The individual incentive offers subsidies based on the farmer individual level of adoption. In contrast, the collective incentive is contingent upon broader community participation; a subsidy is granted only if at least 50% of a community's plots are managed under sustainable agriculture. This structure aims to encourage community-wide coordination by linking immediate and concrete benefits to collective action. Our lab-in-the-field experiments provide insights into how these incentives influence farmers' decisions. The study aims to evaluate which incentive structure more effectively promotes the adoption of sustainable cropping systems. The results will contribute to a broader understanding of policy mechanisms that can support the transition towards environmentally sustainable and economically viable agricultural systems in resource-constrained settings.
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