Primary Outcomes (explanation)
1. Bargaining power of wife in joint decision is constructed from Tasks 1 and 4 in the experiment (details of the Tasks are presented in the Experimental Design, below). Denote the wife and husband's individual risk preferences as A and B respectively, and the joint risk preference in Task 4 as C. In cases where C lies in between A and B, the wife's bargaining power is calculated as (C-B)/(A-B). In cases where C lies outside A and B, the wife's bargaining power = 0 if C is closer to B, and = 1 if C is closer to A. If A and B are the same, the wife's bargaining power is undefined and the observation is dropped.
2. Bargaining power of wife (inferred from allocation task, Task 2, see below) is measured as 1 - WTP, where WTP is the wife's willingness to pay to control the household budget. WTP is measured as (350 - X)/350, where X is the amount of rupees for self which makes the wife indifferent with her husband receiving 350 rupees, as measured in Task 2.
3. Social norms regarding female empowerment are measured by the aggregate responses to each question in Task 3. The possible responses are "very appropriate", "somewhat appropriate", "somewhat inappropriate", "very inappropriate". We will observe the raw distributions of responses for each of the 24 outcomes (own opinion, guess of men's most common response, guess of women's most common response, for each of the 8 questions). Following the standard approach in the literature, we will also convert the responses into numerical values of 1, 1/3, -1/3 and -1 respectively and estimate the mean response for each outcome.