Morals in Markets with Network Externalities

Last registered on November 15, 2024

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Morals in Markets with Network Externalities
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0014811
Initial registration date
November 11, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
November 15, 2024, 1:46 PM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Purdue University

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
University of Aberdeen

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2024-11-15
End date
2025-05-09
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Climate change, biodiversity loss, pollution of air and waterways from plastics and other types of contaminants, are topical examples of major environmental problems confronting societies worldwide. In view of these environmental pressures, a debate has arisen around what constitutes a “moral economy,” and especially how markets shape socially responsible behavior. This experiment aims to enhance our economic understanding of how consumption behavior is affected by the way markets are organized. The project particularly seeks to shed light on the question to what extent the degree of market competition can effectively guide consumption of products that exhibit moral features. In the experiment, purchases of one product type will result in the real planting of trees to offset carbon emissions. The experiment will also feature consumption externalities, where buyers’ value is increasing in the number of other consumers purchasing the same product type. These types of network externalities are common for information‐technology based products, but they can also arise from moral choices such as participating in markets with environmental externalities, such as in the case of electric vehicles.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Cason, Timothy and Frans de Vries. 2024. "Morals in Markets with Network Externalities." AEA RCT Registry. November 15. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14811-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
The trading institution, either a continuous double auction or a seller posted offer, will be varied across treatments. The experiment may include a non-market baseline treatment. Although the baseline environment includes consumption externalities, the design may be extended to eliminate these externalities to determine how this affects moral consumption choices.
Intervention Start Date
2024-11-15
Intervention End Date
2025-05-09

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Fraction of traded products benefiting the environment
Prices of two types of products (“moral” and “immoral”), and their average price difference within markets
Convergence to equilibrium product purchases (all one type or the other)
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Note: Analysis will consider later rounds outcomes separately, after market has an opportunity to converge

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Bid and offer behavior leading to transaction prices
Buyer and seller earnings
Number of trees planted and environmental benefits generated
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
This is a laboratory experiment, conducted in a standard university experimental economics lab, recruiting students broadly across the university. Subjects will be randomly assigned to treatments, and then randomly assigned to roles (buyers or sellers) and into fixed markets. Two types of products will be available for trade with induced values and costs. The products differ in their production costs and the environmental externalities they produce, with the moral product being the higher-cost type The baseline experimental environment features consumption externalities, as the buyers’ value of purchased products in each round increases as more buyers buy units of the same type. The experiment may also include a non-market baseline, with payoffs determined by fixed seller prices.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Subjects will be recruited by email using ORSEE. They choose between a list of available sessions, and the session is randomized to a treatment before it is initialized.
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
16 markets of 11 traders each for the baseline environment
Sample size: planned number of observations
176 individuals
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
8 markets (88 subjects) for double auction institution
8 markets (88 subjects) for posted offer institution
Additional observations for a potential non-market baseline, and for a control treatment without consumption externalities
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Based on the most similar environment in Bartling, Weber and Yao (QJE, 2015), which features a posted offer trading environment and a different type of (non-environmental) externality, we anticipate a mean percentage of “moral” products sold to be approximately 0.46. (A pilot posted offer session using our design generated a rate that fit into their distribution of 7 market sessions.) Our pilot session using the double auction institution resulted in a moral product transaction rate of 0.18. The design is powered to identify this effect size of 0.28 at 80% power (two-tailed significance level of 5%), using the standard deviation across sessions observed by Bartling et al. (0.208 for their main posted offer treatment, and 0.142 for the lowest moral product rate with high costs).
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Purdue University Institutional Review Board
IRB Approval Date
2019-02-05
IRB Approval Number
1902021679
Analysis Plan

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