Intervention(s)
Ljungqvist, et al [2006] explore the model including sentiment investors and derive both underpricing and underperformance results of IPO pricing endogenously. In their model, there are some sentiment investors who have excessive expectations and buy the stocks at a higher price. This initially causes underpricing, and then leads to further declines as they revise their naive estimates, which leads to underperformance.
At first glance, the underpricing results may be theoretically obvious because sentiment investors buy stocks at higher prices than their fundamental value. But their important theoretical contribution is that underpricing still occurs even if the underwriter has no bargaining power, which means that the IPO price could be equal to the stock price, which is not underpricing, even if sentiment investors buy at a higher price than the fundamental value. Although sentiment investors tend to buy the stock more than the fundamental price, and the price could be higher than the fundamental value, such an expectation could change when the bubble crashes, and the price could go down to the fundamental value thereafter. Considering the possibility of bubble crash, the IPO company must set the IPO price equal to the expected value, which could be lower than the stock price.
If there is no crash, the IPO company can sell the stock at the same price as the market price and there is no underpricing. If crashes occur, on the other hand, the IPO company must sell the stock at the expected value, which is lower than the initial prices, so underpricing occurs.
This is the main logic of Ljungqvist, et al [2006] in which underpricing occurs or not. And it is mainly based on the amount of initial shares that the IPO company sells to the underwriters at the beginning. If the amount of initial stock is smaller than the demand of sentiment investors of the market, there is no uncertainty and underpricing could not occur. If the amount of initial stock is larger, on the other hand, the underwriter should sell the remaining stock at the second stage of the market, even if the bubble could crash and the price could go down to the fundamental value, because selling all the amount at the first stage will make rational investors buy stock and the price will go down drastically. So the underwriter has to wait for the remaining shares to be sold in the next phase. Then underpricing occurs.
We verify the results through experiments. In the experiment, IPO company is exogenous, and we hire the subject assigning the role of underwriter who sells the stock in the market. As Ljungqvist, et al [2006] assumed, the subject has two chances to sell the stock. Namely, the market opens twice and they can sell the stock twice. The investors, whether sentimental or rational, are price takers and exogenous. And the price is set automatically.
From their proposition, if initial stock amount is smaller, underprice does not occur, while large, it occurs. And we use two conditions: small amount and large. In addition, the probability of crash is considered important. So, other condition is higher probability or lower probability that bubble will continue. Thus, we introduce 4 conditions. In the experiment, both IPO company and investor are assumed to be exogenous. And we hire the subjects who assign the role of underwriter. In the experiment,
Timeline of Ljungqvist, et al [2006] model and our experiment is as follows
1. The IPO company (exogenous) offers the number of shares to be issued and sells them to the underwriter (endogenous) at the price equal to the expected average price of the market.
2. Underwriter (subject) sells shares in the open market (open for two periods) in order to maximize their profit. The price of the market at the first stage as well as the second state is determined by the total initial stock and crash probability,
3. After selling the stock, the underwriters' profit is revealed and they get the reward.