Abstract
This experiment examines how firms adjust production decisions under different environmental policy regimes. Participants are assigned to one of three treatments: a control group with free output choice and emissions information, a carbon tax treatment where firms pay for each unit of emissions, and a carbon trading treatment requiring permits that can be traded in a market. Firms are divided into large and small producers, differing in production capacity and emission intensity. Within the trading treatment, we compare two allocation schemes—grandfathering (permits allocated based on initial endowments) versus equal allocation without grandfathering. Across 12 rounds, participants make output decisions based on marginal costs, policy rules, and market conditions, with real monetary payoffs determined by one randomly selected round. To connect laboratory choices to real-world environmental impact, the organizers purchase real-world carbon offsets based on the lab result. This design links participants’ profit-maximizing strategies directly to tangible carbon outcomes, allowing us to study policy effectiveness, firm heterogeneity, and the role of permit allocation in shaping both market efficiency and environmental results.