The effects of industry gifts on expert behavior

Last registered on October 22, 2025

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
The effects of industry gifts on expert behavior
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0017025
Initial registration date
October 14, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
October 22, 2025, 1:00 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
ESCP Business School

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Université Paris Panthéon Assas
PI Affiliation
CNRS, IESEG School of Management

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2025-03-01
End date
2026-03-31
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Industry gifts to experts tasked with making decisions on behalf of their clients are a common phenomenon. We analyze the impact of such gifts on experts' product recommendations and diagnostic effort decisions in a laboratory experiment. A theoretical model in which the expert cares for the client but also has a reciprocity concern, predicts biased recommendations and distorted diagnostic effort, depending on prior information. To test this, we conduct a laboratory experiment in which experts repeatedly make product choices for clients whose need is uncertain.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Crainich, David, Wanda Mimra and Anne-Laure Samson. 2025. "The effects of industry gifts on expert behavior." AEA RCT Registry. October 22. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17025-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Theoretical model of expert behavior under uncertainty and reciproicity concerns tested in a laboratory experiment.
Intervention (Hidden)
Intervention Start Date
2025-10-15
Intervention End Date
2026-03-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Expert product choice (binary); expert diagnostic effort
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Correct product choice; Consumer welfare; gift-giving
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Experimental subjects are assigned the role of producer, expert and client. There is initial uncertainty which product best matches the client's need. Producers can send a (monetary) gift to experts. Experts have a prior about product match for the client, and take a product decision on behalf of the client. Experts can also exert effort to receive a signal about product match.
Experimental Design Details
At the beginning of the experiment, participants are randomly assigned to a role that they keep throughout the experiment: expert, client, producer A or producer B. The experiment consists of 15 rounds. In each round, participants are randomly grouped into 4-person teams, including 1 expert, 1 client, 1 producer A, and 1 producer B. The composition of each group changes in each round.
In each round, the expert must make decisions for the client in their group. The client needs either product A or product B. The expert does not know the client's actual need. However, they know which category their client belongs to and are aware of the probability ( p ) that an individual needs product A, within each category. The client's category and actual need can change in each period.

DESCRIPTION OF A ROUND
The experiment is composed of 15 rounds. Each round is composed of 3 steps.
Step 1
At the beginning of each period, one of the two producers (A or B) receives some tokens. The producer who receives the tokens (A or B) may vary from one period to another, based on a random draw. This producer can then choose to keep the tokens for themselves or to send them to the expert. If the tokens are transmitted, the expert knows which producer sent them. However, if the producer chooses to keep them, the expert does not know which producer could have transmitted them. Neither the client nor the other producer is informed of this decision.

Step 2
The expert is responsible for making an initial decision for the client within their group. The client needs either product A or product B, but the actual need is not known with certainty by the expert. However, the expert knows the category to which their client belongs, numbered from 1 to 9.
Each category provides information about the probable need of the client by offering statistical data: it indicates, among 1,000 clients in that category, how many need product A and how many need product B. For example, if a client belongs to category 3, it means that out of 1,000 clients in this category, 300 needed product A and 700 needed product B.The expert must then choose a product for their client.
Simultaneously, the client is informed of the category to which they belong during this period, but not of their actual need. They also have access to the statistical information and must indicate which product they would choose for themselves based on the available information.

Step 3
The expert can decide to try to better determine the client’s actual need during this period. To do this, they can choose to spend a certain number of tokens. The more tokens spent, the higher the chance of discovering the client’s true need (truth or noise signal). A table is given to the expert, that shows how the chances of uncovering the client’s actual need evolve depending on the number of tokens spent.

A draw is conducted based on the number of tokens spent:
• Either the expert discovers the client’s actual need during this period (product A or B);
• Or they do not obtain any additional information.

After the draw, whether or not the expert has gained extra information about the client’s need, they must once again choose the product to recommend to their client during this period. Neither the client nor the producers are informed of the number of tokens spent, nor of the final product chosen.

Subsequently to the main experiment, at the end of the 15 rounds, a belief survey is administered, tailored to the different roles, furthermore a survey is conducted to gather data about the participants’ social and risk preferences as well as socio-demographics.

TREATMENTS
We will consider 4 between-subject treatments:
1. Gift Treatment (Main):
Producers can send gifts in each round if they are randomly assigned the right to gift the expert. Experts may or may not receive a gift in each round depending on producer behavior. This creates variation in gift exposure across rounds for each expert.
2. Information Treatment (Main):
Producers may send messages about product match (optionally with a gift).
3. Gift Refusal (Control):
Experts have the possibility to refuse the gift sent by the producer.
4. Commission Treatment (Control):
Producers may offer a commission, but only if their product is selected.
Randomization Method
Random assignment done by computer.
Randomization Unit
individual
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
40 groups per main treatment
Sample size: planned number of observations
600 main outcome decisions per treatment
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
40 per main treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
INSEAD Institutional Review Board
IRB Approval Date
2025-04-09
IRB Approval Number
2025-18

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials