The effects of industry gifts on expert behavior

Last registered on October 22, 2025
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
The effects of industry gifts on expert behavior
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0017025
Initial registration date
October 14, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
October 22, 2025, 1:00 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Name
Wanda Mimra
Affiliation
ESCP Business School
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Anne-Laure Samson
PI Affiliation
Université Paris Panthéon Assas
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PI Name
David Crainich
PI Affiliation
CNRS, IESEG School of Management
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Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2025-03-01
End date
2026-03-31
Keywords
Behavior, Lab
Additional Keywords
expert markets, laboratory experiment, diagnostic effort, reciprocity
JEL code(s)
D81, D82, I11
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Industry gifts to experts tasked with making decisions on behalf of their clients are a common phenomenon. We analyze the impact of such gifts on experts' product recommendations and diagnostic effort decisions in a laboratory experiment. A theoretical model in which the expert cares for the client but also has a reciprocity concern, predicts biased recommendations and distorted diagnostic effort, depending on prior information. To test this, we conduct a laboratory experiment in which experts repeatedly make product choices for clients whose need is uncertain.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Crainich, David, Wanda Mimra and Anne-Laure Samson. 2025. "The effects of industry gifts on expert behavior." AEA RCT Registry. October 22. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17025-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Theoretical model of expert behavior under uncertainty and reciproicity concerns tested in a laboratory experiment.
Intervention Start Date
2025-10-15
Intervention End Date
2026-03-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Expert product choice (binary); expert diagnostic effort
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Correct product choice; Consumer welfare; gift-giving
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Experimental subjects are assigned the role of producer, expert and client. There is initial uncertainty which product best matches the client's need. Producers can send a (monetary) gift to experts. Experts have a prior about product match for the client, and take a product decision on behalf of the client. Experts can also exert effort to receive a signal about product match.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Random assignment done by computer.
Randomization Unit
individual
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
40 groups per main treatment
Sample size: planned number of observations
600 main outcome decisions per treatment
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
40 per main treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
INSEAD Institutional Review Board
IRB Approval Date
2025-04-09
IRB Approval Number
2025-18
Analysis Plan