Experimental Design Details
The experiment uses a between-subjects design with random assignment to one of five incentive conditions: no rebate, sure rebate (100 percent probability), or a probabilistic rebate paid with 50 percent, 25 percent, or 10 percent probability. Each participant completes four decision rounds. In each round, participants choose an integer number of units n = {0,1,2,3} of a fictitious consumption good.
The price of the good is fixed at P = 2.50 per unit. Each unit provides a privately induced monetary value, with values equal to v1 = 6, v2 = 4, and v3 = 2 for the first, second, and third unit, respectively. Monetary payoffs in each round are equal to the sum of the values of the purchased units minus total expenditure, plus any rebate realized in that round. In the no-rebate condition, no rebate is available.
In rebate conditions, participants are eligible to receive a monetary rebate of $0.50 for each unit not consumed. In the sure rebate treatment, the rebate is paid with certainty. In the probabilistic rebate treatments, the rebate is paid with the treatment-specific probability (50 percent, 25 percent, or 10 percent), independently for each participant and round. Participants are informed of the rebate probability associated with their assigned treatment before making decisions.
Each unit of consumption is associated with carbon emissions. For each unit not consumed, the experimenters commit to offset 50 pounds of carbon dioxide. As a result, carbon offsets per round equal 150 pounds if zero units are purchased, 100 pounds if one unit is purchased, 50 pounds if two units are purchased, and zero pounds if three units are purchased. Participants receive feedback after each round about the carbon offset implied by their decision.
At the end of the experiment, one of the four rounds is randomly selected to determine monetary payoffs. Carbon offsets associated with all rounds are implemented as described in the instructions. Randomization is conducted at the individual level, and aside from the rebate probability, all participants face identical prices, values, payoff rules, and information.