Heterogeneity and Social Norms in Collective-Risk Social Dilemma

Last registered on January 28, 2026

View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title

Heterogeneity and Social Norms in Collective-Risk Social Dilemma

RCT ID

AEARCTR-0017765

Initial registration date

January 25, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published

January 28, 2026, 7:38 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Primary Investigator

Name

Tongzhe Li

Affiliation

University of Guelph

Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name

Huan Xie

PI Affiliation

Concordia University

Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status

In development

Start date

2026-01-29

End date

2026-05-31

Keywords

Behavior

Additional Keywords

threshold public goods game, collective-risk social dilemma, social norm elicitation

JEL code(s)

C91, C92, H41

Secondary IDs

Prior work

This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.

Abstract

We propose a lab experiment to study public goods provision and the effect of social norm elicitation in a threshold public goods game with heterogeneous agents. The game features a collective target and the loss of a portion of individual endowment when the collective target is not reached, mimicking social dilemma situations involving collective risk. Our experimental design introduces heterogeneity across agents in both endowments and loss ratios. The experiment examines 1) how public goods provision is affected by the correlation between heterogeneous endowments and loss ratios, and 2) the impact of social norm elicitation in this setting.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation

Li, Tongzhe and Huan Xie. 2026. "Heterogeneity and Social Norms in Collective-Risk Social Dilemma." AEA RCT Registry. January 28. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17765-1.0

Sponsors & Partners

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

Intervention Start Date

2026-01-29

Intervention End Date

2026-05-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)

Public goods provision, efficiency, equilibrium selection

Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)

Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

We propose a 2x3 between-subject experimental design, with 6 treatments in total. In one dimension, we vary whether heterogenous endowments and loss ratios across subjects are positively or negatively correlated. In the other dimension, we vary the procedure of eliciting the endogenous social norm.

In the social norm elicitation, subjects are asked to rate the appropriateness of different contribution rules and are incentivized to match their ratings with the modal appropriateness in the session.

Each session consists of multiple rounds of a one-shot threshold public goods game.

Treatment 1: Baseline under Positive Correlation
The game is based on a parameterization that introduces a positive correlation between heterogenous endowments and loss ratios across subjects. The appropriateness of different contribution rules is elicited once at the end of the session as a control.

Treatment 2: Baseline under Negative Correlation
The game is based on a parameterization that introduces a negative correlation between heterogenous endowments and loss ratios across subjects. The appropriateness of different contribution rules is elicited once at the end of the session as a control.

Treatment 3: Social Norm with Feedback under Positive Correlation
The game is based on a parameterization that introduces a positive correlation between heterogenous endowments and loss ratios across subjects. The appropriateness of different contribution rules is elicited multiple times across different rounds during the session, and the results of the social norm elicitation are provided to subjects after each elicitation.

Treatment 4: Social Norm with Feedback under Negative Correlation
The game is based on a parameterization that introduces a negative correlation between heterogenous endowments and loss ratios across subjects. The appropriateness of different contribution rules is elicited multiple times across different rounds during the session, and the results of the social norm elicitation are provided to subjects after each elicitation.

Treatment 5: Social Norm without Feedback under Positive Correlation
The game is based on a parameterization that introduces a positive correlation between heterogenous endowments and loss ratios across subjects. The appropriateness of different contribution rules is elicited multiple times across different rounds during the session, and the results of the social norm elicitation are not provided to subjects after each elicitation.

Treatment 6: Social Norm without Feedback under Negative Correlation
The game is based on a parameterization that introduces a negative correlation between heterogenous endowments and loss ratios across subjects. The appropriateness of different contribution rules is elicited multiple times across different rounds during the session, and the results of the social norm elicitation are not provided to subjects after each elicitation.

Experimental Design Details

Not available

Randomization Method

Randomization done by computer.

Randomization Unit

Treatments are randomized at the session level. Each participant's player type remains the same throughout the session. Group members are rematched and randomly drawn each round.

Was the treatment clustered?