Reducing Sabotage in Tournaments: The Roles of Reward Publicity and Tournament Horizon

Last registered on October 07, 2026
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Reducing Sabotage in Tournaments: The Roles of Reward Publicity and Tournament Horizon
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0019835
Initial registration date
September 30, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
October 07, 2026, 10:25 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Name
Boyang (George) Li
Affiliation
ESSEC business school
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2026-10-08
End date
2027-12-31
Keywords
Behavior, Electoral, Firms & Productivity, Lab, Labor
Additional Keywords
tournament, relative performance incentives, sabotage, management control
JEL code(s)
C92, J33, M41, M52
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This study examines how reward publicity and tournament horizon jointly affect sabotage in tournaments. Public reward delivery can increase sabotage by raising the status value of winning, but it can also reduce sabotage by increasing the psychological cost of receiving recognition after harming competitors. I predict that the relative strength of these effects depends on tournament horizon. I test this prediction in a 2 × 2 laboratory experiment that manipulates whether tournament winners are recognized privately or publicly and whether rewards are awarded through repeated sprint tournaments or one cumulative marathon tournament, while holding the total monetary reward constant. Participants compete in fixed three-person groups over eight rounds. In each round, participants complete a slider task by moving sliders to a specified target and decide whether to reduce both competitors’ working time at a small cost to their own working time. I measure sabotage using participants’ repeated time-reduction decisions and measure individual performance using the number of sliders positioned correctly.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Li, Boyang (George). 2026. "Reducing Sabotage in Tournaments: The Roles of Reward Publicity and Tournament Horizon." AEA RCT Registry. October 07. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19835-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2026-10-08
Intervention End Date
2026-11-05

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
The primary outcome is participant sabotage frequency, calculated as the total number of rounds in which the participant chooses to sabotage across the eight tournament rounds. The measure ranges from 0 to 8, with higher values indicating more frequent sabotage. In each round, choosing to sabotage reduces each competitor’s working time at a small cost to the participant’s own working time.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The study uses a 2 × 2 between-subjects laboratory experiment. The first factor is reward publicity: tournament winners are informed either privately or publicly recognized by standing and receiving applause from the other participants in the session. The second factor is tournament horizon: participants compete in either eight separate sprint tournaments or one cumulative marathon tournament conducted over eight rounds. The total monetary reward is held constant across tournament horizons. Participants compete in fixed groups of three and complete a slider task in every round. Before starting each round, each participant decides whether to reduce both competitors’ working time at a small cost to their own working time.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Participants will be randomly assigned by computer to one of the four experimental conditions.
Randomization Unit
The individual participant is the unit of randomization. Each participant is randomly assigned to one experimental condition.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
240 individual participants. The study does not use cluster-level randomization.
Sample size: planned number of observations
240 individual participants.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Private Winner Recognition × Sprint Tournament: 60 participants.
Public Winner Recognition × Sprint Tournament: 60 participants.
Private Winner Recognition × Marathon Tournament: 60 participants.
Public Winner Recognition × Marathon Tournament: 60 participants.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
ESSEC Business School Research Ethics Committee
IRB Approval Date
2026-09-18
IRB Approval Number
2026-051
Analysis Plan