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Beliefs about Behavioral Responses to Taxation
Last registered on May 02, 2017

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Beliefs about Behavioral Responses to Taxation
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0002186
Initial registration date
May 02, 2017
Last updated
May 02, 2017 2:19 PM EDT
Location(s)
Region
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
University of Bergen
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
NHH Norwegian School of Economics
PI Affiliation
NHH Norwegian School of Economics
Additional Trial Information
Status
In development
Start date
2017-05-02
End date
2017-05-31
Secondary IDs
Abstract
We collect novel data on people's beliefs about behavioral responses to taxation. First, we recruit workers from an online labor market to work on a task for one hour. We randomly manipulate the piece rate offered to the workers and whether they have to pay taxes on their earnings. We use these data to elicit incentivized beliefs from a representative sample of the U.S. population about how taxes affect people's effort choices. In particular, we provide evidence on whether Republicans and Democrats, who have very different views on redistribution of income and wealth, are divided in their beliefs about how taxes affect economic behavior.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Cappelen, Alexander, Ingar Haaland and Bertil Tungodden. 2017. "Beliefs about Behavioral Responses to Taxation." AEA RCT Registry. May 02. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2186-1.0.
Former Citation
Cappelen, Alexander et al. 2017. "Beliefs about Behavioral Responses to Taxation." AEA RCT Registry. May 02. http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2186/history/17115.
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2017-05-02
Intervention End Date
2017-05-31
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
The key outcome variable is beliefs about the difference in production between workers in "High Pay" and workers in "Low Pay" (Treatment 1), "Government Tax" (Treatment 2), and "Redistributive Tax" (Treatment 3).
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
We recruit workers from an online labor market to work on a task for one hour. We randomly manipulate the piece rate offered to the workers and whether they have to pay taxes on their earnings. We use these data to elicit incentivized beliefs from a representative sample of the U.S. population about how taxes affect people's effort choices. Our key research question is whether beliefs differ between Republicans and Democrats.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Randomizer in Qualtrics with the option "evenly present elements".
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
4500 spectators.
Sample size: planned number of observations
4500 spectators.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
1500 spectators in each treatment (i.e., 1500 spectators in Treatment 1; 1500 spectators in Treatment 2; and 1500 spectators in Treatment 3).
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Analysis Plan

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