Report Cards: The Impact of Providing School and Child Test Scores on Educational Markets

Last registered on October 07, 2026
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Report Cards: The Impact of Providing School and Child Test Scores on Educational Markets
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0000242
Initial registration date
October 02, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
October 07, 2026, 10:16 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
Pakistan
Region
South Asia

Primary Investigator

Name
Jishnu Das
Affiliation
The World Bank
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Asim Khwaja
PI Affiliation
Harvard University
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PI Name
Tahir Andrabi
PI Affiliation
Pomona College
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Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2004-02-01
End date
2006-06-30
Keywords
Education
Additional Keywords
Educational Markets, Information Provision, Private Schools, Market-level Experiments
JEL code(s)
O12, I25, L15, L22, D22, D82
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
We study the impact of providing school and child test scores on subsequent test scores, prices, and enrollment in markets with multiple public and private providers. A randomly selected half of our sample villages (markets) received report cards. This increased test scores by 0.11 standard deviations, decreased private school fees by 17 percent and increased primary enrollment by four percent. Heterogeneity in the treatment impact by initial school quality is consistent with canonical models of asymmetric information. Information provision facilitates better comparisons across providers, improves market efficiency and raises child welfare through higher test scores, higher enrollment and lower fees.
External Link(s)
Press Coverage: Aman, Harvard SAI, CERP join hands to educate deprived
J-PAL evaluation summary

Registration Citation

Citation
Andrabi, Tahir, Jishnu Das and Asim Khwaja. 2026. " Report Cards: The Impact of Providing School and Child Test Scores on Educational Markets." AEA RCT Registry. October 07. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.242-1.0
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
We first tested Grade 3 children in all primary schools and then, in a randomly selected 50 percent of the villages, disseminated report cards with the results of school and child test scores for all schools and tested children.
Intervention (Hidden)
Intervention Start Date
2004-09-01
Intervention End Date
2004-09-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Test scores, school fees, enrollment, investments in learning.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The content, design, and delivery of the report cards were based on focus group discussions with parents and schools, where the consensus was that parents wanted both the (absolute and relative) scores of their child and of schools in their village. The two main design challenges we had to address were that (a) school-level test scores potentially reflect a combination of school performance and child selection and (b) test information may be insufficiently granular to allow households to distinguish between different kinds of schools.

Card 1 of the report card reported the score of the child in English, Mathematics, and Urdu, as well as their quintile rank across all tested children. In addition, we also included the average village and school score for the child’s village and school and a quintile rank for each of these. Card 2 of the report card reported scores for all schools in the village, with their quintile rank and the number of children tested. Given that many illiterate parents needed to have the cards explained to them, cards were delivered in person in discussion groups rather than sent by mail.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomly selected from a list frame of villages with at least one private school.
Randomization Unit
Randomization conducted at the village level
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
112 villages
Sample size: planned number of observations
800 public and private schools
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
56 control villages, 56 treatment villages
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Committee on Use of Human Subject in Research (CUHS)
IRB Approval Date
2009-12-16
IRB Approval Number
F18543
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
Yes
Intervention Completion Date
September 30, 2004, 12:00 AM +00:00
Data Collection Complete
Yes
Data Collection Completion Date
June 30, 2006, 12:00 AM +00:00
Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization)
112 villages
Was attrition correlated with treatment status?
No
Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations
823 public and private schools
Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms
56 control and 56 treatment
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
No
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Abstract
This paper studies the impact of providing school and child test scores on subsequent test scores, prices, and enrollment in markets with multiple public and private providers. A randomly selected half of the sample villages (markets) received report cards. This increased test scores by 0.11 standard deviations, decreased private school fees by 17 percent, and increased primary enrollment by 4.5 percent. Heterogeneity in the treatment impact by initial school quality is consistent with canonical models of asymmetric information. Information provision facilitates better comparisons across providers, improves market efficiency and raises child welfare through higher test scores, higher enrollment, and lower fees.
Citation
Andrabi, Tahir, Jishnu Das, and Asim Ijaz Khwaja. 2017. "Report Cards: The Impact of Providing School and Child Test Scores on Educational Markets." American Economic Review 107 (6): 1535–63.
URL
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20140774

Reports & Other Materials