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Investing Public Goods: Evidence from Experiments on Groundwater Management in Gujarat
Last registered on October 24, 2017

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Investing Public Goods: Evidence from Experiments on Groundwater Management in Gujarat
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0002547
Initial registration date
October 23, 2017
Last updated
October 24, 2017 1:00 PM EDT
Location(s)

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Request Information
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
MIT
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
MIT
Additional Trial Information
Status
On going
Start date
2017-10-01
End date
2020-12-01
Secondary IDs
Abstract
This project seeks to understand the role of externalities in limiting agricultural irrigation efficiency. In a randomized controlled trial among farmers in coastal areas of Gujarat, we will experimentally offer direct incentives for increasing irrigation efficiency in the form of marginal prices for pumping groundwater. We expect to follow up this small-scale experiment with further work in a larger experiment with additional treatment groups, and more statistical power.

By measuring the effects of this intervention on electricity and water consumption, we can learn how farmers respond to this policy. We provide some of the first experimental evidence on responses to water prices in a developing country.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Hagerty, Nick and Ariel Zucker. 2017. "Investing Public Goods: Evidence from Experiments on Groundwater Management in Gujarat." AEA RCT Registry. October 24. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2547-1.0.
Former Citation
Hagerty, Nick and Ariel Zucker. 2017. "Investing Public Goods: Evidence from Experiments on Groundwater Management in Gujarat." AEA RCT Registry. October 24. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2547/history/22625.
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
We will examine the effects of offering “Conservation Credits” to farmers. Farmers receiving this intervention will receive a conservation credit – a financial incentive – for reducing their monthly water usage below an individual-specific benchmark.
Intervention Start Date
2017-10-25
Intervention End Date
2018-04-25
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Irrigation intensity
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
Farmers in the sample will be individually randomized into either a treatment group or control, stratified on village and an irrigation intensity “benchmark” calculated from baseline survey data.
• Group A (Control Group) – will receive no new incentives.
• Group B (Conservation Credits) – will receive payments for reducing electricity consumption below a carefully modeled baseline consumption level.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Random assignment to treatment/comparison groups will be generated by statistical software (STATA).
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
90 farmers
Sample size: planned number of observations
90 farmers
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
45 farmers in each of treatment and control groups.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
MIT Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects
IRB Approval Date
2017-03-09
IRB Approval Number
1602472778