Consequences of cooperation: Linking cooperative behavior and outcomes in a large-scale experiment

Last registered on February 09, 2026

View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title

Consequences of cooperation: Linking cooperative behavior and outcomes in a large-scale experiment

RCT ID

AEARCTR-0002596

Initial registration date

November 24, 2017

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published

November 26, 2017, 2:51 PM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated

February 09, 2026, 11:10 AM EST

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Country

Germany

Region

Primary Investigator

Name

Marvin Deversi

Affiliation

Ludwig-Maximilans-University Munich

Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name

Martin Kocher

PI Affiliation

Institute for Advanced Studies Vienna and University of Vienna

Contact Investigator

PI Name

Christiane Schwieren

PI Affiliation

University of Heidelberg

Contact Investigator

PI Name

Simeon Schudy

PI Affiliation

Uni Ulm

Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status

Completed

Start date

2017-11-08

End date

2017-11-25

Keywords

Labor

Additional Keywords

Cooperative behavior, cooperative norms, real-life outcomes in a multinational company

JEL code(s)

Secondary IDs

Prior work

This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.

Abstract

This project provides evidence on how cooperative inclination is related to professional behavior and success in a large multinational software corporation. We analyze data to be elicited through artefactual field experiments and company data to be linked on the individual and group level. Also, potential sources of naturally occurring experiments as well as potential field interventions are anticipated. The three main hypotheses we are going to address are the effect of cooperative inclination measured via variants of the public goods game on main outcome variables of professional behavior within a company (1), the predictive power of cooperative norms elicited through coordination mechanisms (2), and the external validity of these experimental measures of cooperation (3).

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation

Deversi, Marvin et al. 2026. "Consequences of cooperation: Linking cooperative behavior and outcomes in a large-scale experiment." AEA RCT Registry. February 09. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2596-3.3

Former Citation

Deversi, Marvin et al. 2026. "Consequences of cooperation: Linking cooperative behavior and outcomes in a large-scale experiment." AEA RCT Registry. February 09. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2596/history/292951

Sponsors & Partners

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

Intervention (Hidden)

Intervention Start Date

2017-11-08

Intervention End Date

2017-11-25

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)

See pre-analysis plan for detailed description of primary outcome variables and respective hypotheses.

Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)

See pre-analysis plan for detailed description of secondary outcome variables and respective hypotheses.

Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

We run artefactual field experiments (public goods games, coordination games, time preference elicitations) in a large multinational company. We link the elicited data with a survey module, company records data and naturally occurring experiments. The artefactual experiments are conducted in two waves and planned field interventions are rolled-out in between.

Experimental Design Details

Randomization Method

Done by the company in a well-trained survey execution team (computer-randomization).

Randomization Unit

We randomize over teams (of at least 8 team members and with a share of German members of at least 70%).

Was the treatment clustered?