Consequences of cooperation: Linking cooperative behavior and outcomes in a large-scale experiment

Last registered on February 20, 2019
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Consequences of cooperation: Linking cooperative behavior and outcomes in a large-scale experiment
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0002596
Initial registration date
November 24, 2017

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
November 26, 2017, 2:51 PM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
February 20, 2019, 1:19 PM EST

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Country
Germany
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Marvin Deversi
Affiliation
Ludwig-Maximilans-University Munich
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Lisa-Marie Schwanebeck
PI Affiliation
University of Heidelberg
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PI Name
Robert Schmidt
PI Affiliation
University of Heidelberg
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PI Name
Christiane Schwieren
PI Affiliation
University of Heidelberg
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PI Name
Martin Kocher
PI Affiliation
Institute for Advanced Studies Vienna and University of Vienna
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Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2017-11-08
End date
2017-11-25
Keywords
Labor
Additional Keywords
Cooperative behavior, cooperative norms, real-life outcomes in a multinational company
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Abstract
This project provides evidence on how cooperative inclination is related to professional behavior and success in a large multinational software corporation. We analyze data to be elicited through artefactual field experiments and company data to be linked on the individual and group level. Also, potential sources of naturally occurring experiments as well as potential field interventions are anticipated. The three main hypotheses we are going to address are the effect of cooperative inclination measured via variants of the public goods game on main outcome variables of professional behavior within a company (1), the predictive power of cooperative norms elicited through coordination mechanisms (2), and the external validity of these experimental measures of cooperation (3).
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Deversi, Marvin et al. 2019. "Consequences of cooperation: Linking cooperative behavior and outcomes in a large-scale experiment." AEA RCT Registry. February 20. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2596-3.0
Former Citation
Deversi, Marvin et al. 2019. "Consequences of cooperation: Linking cooperative behavior and outcomes in a large-scale experiment." AEA RCT Registry. February 20. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2596/history/41787
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2017-11-08
Intervention End Date
2017-11-25

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
See pre-analysis plan for detailed description of primary outcome variables and respective hypotheses.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
See pre-analysis plan for detailed description of secondary outcome variables and respective hypotheses.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We run artefactual field experiments (public goods games, coordination games, time preference elicitations) in a large multinational company. We link the elicited data with a survey module, company records data and naturally occurring experiments. The artefactual experiments are conducted in two waves and planned field interventions are rolled-out in between.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Done by the company in a well-trained survey execution team (computer-randomization).
Randomization Unit
We randomize over teams (of at least 8 team members and with a share of German members of at least 70%).
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
500 subjects in first wave, 500 subjects in second wave. Total of 100 teams.
Sample size: planned number of observations
500 subjects in first wave, 500 subjects in second wave. Total of 100 teams.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
See above.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials