Economic Game Study [Redistributive Behaviour and the Self-Serving Bias]

Last registered on June 24, 2018

View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title

Economic Game Study [Redistributive Behaviour and the Self-Serving Bias]

RCT ID

AEARCTR-0002654

Initial registration date

February 20, 2018

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published

February 20, 2018, 6:44 PM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated

June 24, 2018, 7:45 PM EDT

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Country

Canada

Region

British Columbia

Primary Investigator

Name

Peter Ward-Griffin

Affiliation

University of British Columbia

Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name

Patrick Francois

PI Affiliation

University of British Columbia

Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status

In development

Start date

2018-02-28

End date

2018-08-15

Keywords

Governance, Labor, Welfare

Additional Keywords

Redistribution, psychology and economics, bias, attribution

JEL code(s)

D91; D81; H23

Secondary IDs

Abstract

In a situation where individuals are uncertain about whether their level of earnings is due to chance or their own performance, are they more likely to attribute higher earnings levels to performance and lower earnings levels to chance? If so, does this “self-serving bias” decrease the amount of money individuals are willing to redistribute to others who earned less?

Using an experimental game setting, I examine differences in redistributive behaviour among individuals based on their earnings determinant (performance, chance, or uncertain). I will first examine whether people have different rates and levels of redistribution depending on their earnings determinant. I will then examine whether earnings level affects perceived earnings determinant. Finally, I will examine differences in redistributive behaviour among individuals who have different beliefs about payment type who are in uncertain payment attribution groups.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation

Francois, Patrick and Peter Ward-Griffin. 2018. "Economic Game Study [Redistributive Behaviour and the Self-Serving Bias]." AEA RCT Registry. June 24. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2654-3.0

Former Citation

Francois, Patrick and Peter Ward-Griffin. 2018. "Economic Game Study [Redistributive Behaviour and the Self-Serving Bias]." AEA RCT Registry. June 24. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2654/history/31133

Sponsors & Partners

Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

Participants will be randomly chosen to have their earnings level determined by performance or chance and half of them will be told their earnings determinant while the other half will have their earnings determinant unknown. I examine the impact of this on redistributive behaviour among high payment participants and redistributive demand among low payment participants. I also examine whether individuals who have uncertain payment types are more likely to attribute payment to performance than chance when they have higher earnings.

Intervention Start Date

2018-02-28

Intervention End Date

2018-08-01

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)

Redistribution amount (in $), Redistribution demanded (in $), Redistribution(Yes ,No), Believed payment determinant (chance or performance),

Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)

Perception of the fairness of the allocation (Is it is fair that, prior to redistribution, some individuals in this study receive $14 and others $1? Very Unfair-Very Fair) , political ideology (1-10 Left-Right individual scale, five item scale, individual statement: "Governments should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off.") Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree 7 point scale)

Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

The five item scale for political ideology consists of five statements with participants responding on a 7 point scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree for each question. These questions are as follows: "Governments should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off." "Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation's wealth." "Big Business benefits owners at the expense of workers." "There is one law for the rich and one for the poor." "Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance."

Experimental Design

2 by 2 by 2 completely between subjects design with 50 subjects per group.

Experimental Design Details

Randomization Method

Randomization of individuals into groups was done by Qualtrics Survey software randomization tool, using the "equal randomization" option.

Randomization Unit

Individual randomization

Was the treatment clustered?

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters

400 Students

Sample size: planned number of observations

400 Students

Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms

50 students in KRH, 50 students in KRL, 50 students in URH, 50 students in URL, 100 students in KP (of which approximately 50 will be in each of KPH and KPL), 100 students in UP (of which approximately 50 will be in each of UPH and UPL).

Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)

Based on a preliminary sample (which will not be included in the final results of the study), the expected difference in redistribution is $1 between individuals in performance and chance conditions while the standard deviation is $1.59. Given this standard deviation and difference in means, to have 80% power with .05 alpha should require 40 individuals per condition and the total sample should be at least 320 students. To further improve this power, I am going to be using a total of approximately 400 students, leading to an expected power of 88%.

Supporting Documents and Materials

IRB