Common-value public goods and informational social dilemmas

Last registered on August 21, 2018

View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title

Common-value public goods and informational social dilemmas

RCT ID

AEARCTR-0003253

Initial registration date

August 20, 2018

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published

August 21, 2018, 12:31 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country

United States of America

Region

Richmond, VA

Primary Investigator

Name

Caleb Cox

Affiliation

Virginia Commonwealth University

Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name

Brock Stoddard

PI Affiliation

Appalachian State University

Additional Trial Information

Status

Completed

Start date

2016-01-29

End date

2017-06-06

Keywords

Other

Additional Keywords

public goods, lab experiment, information, cheap talk, game theory, cooperation

JEL code(s)

C72, D83, H41

Secondary IDs

Abstract

We experimentally examine the role of private information and communication in a public goods environment with uncertain returns. We consider a public goods game in which the Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR) is either high or low. Before contributing, three players observe private signals correlated with the true MPCR and then send cheap talk messages to one another. There are social gains from truthful communication, but a private incentive to exaggerate. We compare treatments with and without cheap talk, finding that messages are largely truthful and influence contribution decisions. In further treatments, we increase the incentive to exaggerate and find reduced truthfulness and smaller gains from communication.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation

Cox, Caleb and Brock Stoddard. 2018. "Common-value public goods and informational social dilemmas." AEA RCT Registry. August 21. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3253-1.0

Former Citation

Cox, Caleb and Brock Stoddard. 2018. "Common-value public goods and informational social dilemmas." AEA RCT Registry. August 21. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3253/history/33300

Sponsors & Partners

Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

Intervention Start Date

2016-01-29

Intervention End Date

2017-06-06

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)

messages sent to other players (truthful or untruthful reporting of private signals); contribution decisions

Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)

Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

We include the following experimental conditions:
Baseline: public goods game with uncertain marginal per capita return (MPCR) drawn from {0,1.1}
Signals: like Baseline, but with private signals correlated with the true MPCR (equals true MPCR with 80% probability).
Cheap Talk: like Signals, but players send messages to one another after observing signals, but before contribution decisions
Signals SR: like Signals, but with a smaller range of possible MPCR values, {0.3,0.8}.
Cheap Talk SR: like Cheap Talk, but with a smaller range of possible MPCR values, {0.3,0.8}.
Signals WS: like Signals, but with weaker signal (equals true MPCR with 70% probability).
Cheap Talk WS: like Cheap Talk, but with weaker signal (equals true MPCR with 70% probability).
Cheap Talk Strat: like Cheap Talk, but choices in each round (message sent, contribution decision) made using strategy method.

Experimental Design Details

Randomization Method

Randomization done in office by computer.

Randomization Unit

Groups of participants (sessions) are randomized to experimental conditions.

Was the treatment clustered?

Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters

38 sessions

Sample size: planned number of observations

426 participants

Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms

Baseline: 42 participants
Signals: 45 participants
Cheap Talk: 96 participants
Signals SR: 33 participants
Cheap Talk SR: 72 participants
Signals WS: 36 participants
Cheap Talk WS: 78 participants
Cheap Talk Strat: 24 participants

Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)

Supporting Documents and Materials

IRB