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Narrow Bracketing in Effort Choices

Last registered on January 25, 2019

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Narrow Bracketing in Effort Choices
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0003412
Initial registration date
January 07, 2019

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
January 25, 2019, 3:31 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
University of Bergamo

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Central European University

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2019-02-10
End date
2019-12-31
Secondary IDs
Abstract
Narrow bracketing has been established in choices over risky gambles, but not outside of it, even in natural situations such as the working environment. Many decisions people take, such as deciding whether to do an urgent, but not particularly important task right now, have low immediate costs – checking emails – but may have large costs later on, such as requiring one to work late when tired to make up the lost time. While sometimes people may take such decisions in full awareness of these implications – either because it is the ‘right/rational’ decision, or because they are present-biased – it may also be due to not thinking about these future implications. Narrow bracketing is a specific way of not thinking about these implications, and we test for it in a situation where preferences, properly thought through, cannot cause such mistakes, even when people are present-biased.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Fallucchi, Francesco and Marc Kaufmann. 2019. "Narrow Bracketing in Effort Choices." AEA RCT Registry. January 25. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3412-1.0
Former Citation
Fallucchi, Francesco and Marc Kaufmann. 2019. "Narrow Bracketing in Effort Choices." AEA RCT Registry. January 25. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3412/history/40591
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
We test the concept of narrow bracketing in deterministic choices over work, which are relevant to the labor market.
Intervention Start Date
2019-02-10
Intervention End Date
2019-12-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Elicitation of the willingness to accept a payment in order to complete a task across different treatments. Thus the question is whether the framing as doing extra work 'before' rather than 'after' - while holding the actual consequences constant - leads to a change in willingness to work, which it cannot under any broadly framed theory.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
We will ask subjects at what price they will be willing to complete a task, based on a piece-rate payment. We will elicit their choices in two different ways.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
We want to measure whether there is a correlation between subject's level of narrow bracketing in deterministic work choices and narrow bracketing in risky choices; whether there is more narrow bracketing when the metrics for the extra work is different from the metric for the main work (that is, it is expressed as a piece-rate, $0.40 per task, rather than $4 for doing 10 tasks), compared to when the metric is the same. A further analysis will be done on an extra within subjects treatment, where both before/after choices will be proposed. We will test whether people make the mistake when they see both choices, controlling for an order effect.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
In a laboratory experiment, using a real effort task, we measure whether psychological factors affect the decisions to work extra time.
Experimental Design Details
In a laboratory experiment with real effort tasks, we measure whether decisions for extra work are narrowly bracketed: whether people make decisions for extra work by thinking only about the direct disutility incurred from doing the extra work, or whether they also take into account the indirect effects of this extra work on other work they already have to complete. Specifically, subjects will be asked to complete a fixed and given amount of work and then be asked to do additional work. However, some subjects will be asked whether they want to do additional work before and other subjects will be asked to do the additional work after the baseline work. Nonetheless, in both cases the choice offered allows to choose exactly the same amount of work for exactly the same amount of money -- the choice set is fixed, including no extra requirements or benefits from working fast or slow. A person who narrowly brackets may nonetheless act differently, since they may perceive the extra tasks differently if they are framed as having to be done before or after the required work. We will consider as a control treatment the request to do additional work after the baseline work. This represents the more natural setting of working extra time. Our hypothesis is that people do narrowly bracket and that they are more willing to do extra work that they are asked to do before rather than after the baseline work. This assumes that tasks feel increasingly more tedious the longer people do them, which we will test as well. We will test this hypothesis in a separate project.

• Experiment based on the transcription task similar to the one used by Augenblick and Rabin (2015).

• Two parts: the first part will be conducted online (via Lioness Lab, Arechar et al., 2018), the second in the laboratory.

• PART 1 Subjects are invited to participate to the first part of the experiment online. Subjects read the instructions online, telling them that the experiment is made of two parts and that earnings are accumulated in both parts and are paid at the end of the experiment.

o PHASE 1: Subjects practice with the transcription task. They are rewarded a fixed amount (participation fee), for performing this task for 10 minutes.
o PHASE 2: Subjects are told that the week after they will perform this task in the lab. They will book the slot where they can participate to the experiment and told that for that session they will be asked to complete 30 of these tasks to receive XX Euros.
o PHASE 3: depending on treatment, they will be given the opportunity to do YY extra tasks either after (CONTROL) or before (TREATMENT) the 30 tasks of fixed work. Subjects will be asked to state the minimum amount of money they would be willing to do this task. For the elicitation we will use two different elicitation methods, randomized across the two treatments.
The two methods are:
- A slider to select the minimum acceptable payment in order to perform a fix amount of work for a fixed amount of money (e.g. 13 tasks for $3.10)
- A set of multiple questions eliciting the minimum acceptable piece rate payment (13 tasks at $0.25/task, $0.30/task, $0.35/task...)

• PART 2
o PHASE 1: One of the choices made during the PHASE 3 will be selected randomly and implemented.
o PHASE 2: Subjects will work and will be rewarded according to the schedule.
o PHASE 3: At the end of the working part, subjects will be asked to answer to a series of incentivized questions, replicating Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009) with low stakes.

The 2x2 between subjects treatment design (before/after and the two elicitation methods) will be followed by one within subjects treatment where both choices to work before/after will be elicited. That is, we will ask some subjects both the "before" and "after" question, but in a randomized order, so that their first choice should be the same as in the treatments where subjects only see "before" or "after" questions, but not both. The subjects who receive both allow us to potentially estimate narrow bracketing at the individual level; or to see if people are less likely to narrowly bracket if they receive the "before" question after the "after" treatment, as this may draw their attention to the identical nature of the choices.

Arechar, A.A., Gächter, S., & Molleman, L. (2018). Conducting interactive experiments online. Experimental economics, 21(1), 99-131.
Augenblick, N., & Rabin, M. (2015). An experiment on time preference and misprediction in unpleasant tasks. The Review of Economic Studies.
Rabin, M., & Weizsäcker, G. (2009). Narrow bracketing and dominated choices. American Economic Review, 99(4), 1508-43.
Randomization Method
Randomization done throughout the recruitment platform Orsee on a students' subject pool from the University of Luxembourg.
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
380 student subjects recruited throughout orsee (Greiner, 2015), 280 for the two main between-subjects treatments and 100 for the within-subjects treatment.
We will initially conduct the two main treatments. The within-subjects will be built as a follow up.
Sample size: planned number of observations
380 student subjects recruited throughout orsee (Greiner, 2015)
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
140 subjects for each of the two between subjects treatments (80 with the slider elicitation methods and 60 with the price list) and 100 subjects in the within subjects treatment.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Based on an expected effect size d = 0.4 we assign 140 observations to each of the two treatments. This gives us 90% power to detect the effect size at the 5% level of significance.
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
CEU Ethical Research Committee
IRB Approval Date
2018-08-13
IRB Approval Number
2017-2018/11/EX

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials