Paternalism and Incentives

Last registered on February 05, 2020

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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title

Paternalism and Incentives

RCT ID

AEARCTR-0003801

Initial registration date

January 15, 2020

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published

January 17, 2020, 11:13 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated

February 05, 2020, 4:56 AM EST

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Country

Germany

Region

Primary Investigator

Name

Robert Stüber

Affiliation

New York University Abu Dhabi

Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status

In development

Start date

2020-01-20

End date

2022-07-01

Keywords

Other

Additional Keywords

paternalism, repugnant transactions, incentives, field-in-the-lab online experiment

JEL code(s)

C93, D01, D40, D47, D63, J47, Z18

Secondary IDs

Abstract

This study analyzes the effects of incentives on paternalistic interventions on "repugnant transactions."

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation

Stüber, Robert. 2020. "Paternalism and Incentives." AEA RCT Registry. February 05. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3801-1.1

Sponsors & Partners

Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

Intervention Start Date

2020-01-20

Intervention End Date

2020-02-29

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)

- Participants' willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the offer being made or not made.
- Discrete decision whether to approve the offer or not. Participants choose between “Approve,” “Do not approve,” and “Undecided: Let chance decide.”

Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)

- Participants' belief about the fraction of people accepting the offer for various monetary amounts.

Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

The participants in the experiment decide whether to approve a "repugnant transaction."

Experimental Design Details

In the online experiment the participants decide whether to allow the experimenter to offer a third person monetary compensation of varying amounts for registering as a bone marrow donor. The experiment consists of five parts and a post-experimental questionnaire, and follows a 2x2x2 factorial design. The first factor varies between subjects and alters whether the participants i) reveal their willingness-to-pay for the offer being made or not, or ii) make a discrete decision whether to approve the offer or not by choosing between the options “Approve,” “Do not approve,” and “Undecided: Let chance decide.” The second factor varies within subjects and alters whether the participant makes her decision for a low/regular monetary amount (in treatment “LOW”) or a very high monetary amount (in treatment “HIGH”). The order of these two treatments is randomly varied in Part 1 and Part 2 of the experiment. Part 3 repeats HIGH but i) in the treatment condition (“TREATMENT”) the participants are informed that, even if they approve the offer, the offer is made only if the person would be willing to accept the offer for the low monetary amount and ii) in the low probability condition (“LOW_PROB”) the participants are informed that, even if they approve the offer, with a certain probability the offer is not made. Whether a participant participates in TREATMENT or LOW_PROB varies between subjects. Part 4 (“UG”) elicits the behindness aversion of all participants using responder decisions in an ultimatum game. In Part 5 (“BELIEFS”) participants’ beliefs about reservation prices are assessed. Participants are asked to state their beliefs about the fraction of people who are willing to register as a bone marrow donor for various monetary amounts of compensation. Finally, a post-experimental questionnaire (“QUEST”) asks participants whether they consider the offer in HIGH to be coercive, and elicits risk-preferences, a psychological measure of envy, and basic demographics.

Randomization Method

The randomization is done by a computer. The variable "id_in_group" randomizes participants into treatments.

Randomization Unit

The randomization unit is the individual.

Was the treatment clustered?

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters

About 1000 clusters.

Sample size: planned number of observations

About 1000 participants.

Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms

Outcome 1: About 375 participants in the treatment group and 375 participants in the control group.
Outcome 2: About 125 participants in the treatment group and 125 participants in the control group.

Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)

Supporting Documents and Materials

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