x

We are happy to announce that all trial registrations will now be issued DOIs (digital object identifiers). For more information, see here.
Investment Decisions with Endogenous Budget Share Allocations Inside the Household
Last registered on April 29, 2019

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Investment Decisions with Endogenous Budget Share Allocations Inside the Household
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0004069
Initial registration date
April 24, 2019
Last updated
April 29, 2019 10:44 PM EDT
Location(s)

This section is unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access to this information.

Request Information
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
Stanford University
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
Aix-Marseille University
PI Affiliation
Stanford University
Additional Trial Information
Status
In development
Start date
2019-05-01
End date
2020-07-31
Secondary IDs
Abstract
This study aims to understand the dynamic relationship between intra-household bargaining and women's consumption decisions. We want to test whether the share of the household budget over which a woman has control is a function of her prior investment decisions and whether these reputation concerns lead women to avoid risky and hide bad decisions. We use a series of lab-in-the-field experiments to test (1) whether husband transfers vary with the salience of the wife’s ability to manage the budget; (2) whether wives are willing to play a game that will potentially send a signal about their performance to their husbands, and whether and how much they are willing to pay a cost to hide signals of poor performance; and (3) whether wives’ willingness to invest varies with the husband’s perception of the cost and the risk of the investment.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Buchmann, Nina, Pascaline Dupas and Roberta Ziparo. 2019. "Investment Decisions with Endogenous Budget Share Allocations Inside the Household." AEA RCT Registry. April 29. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4069-1.0.
Former Citation
Buchmann, Nina, Pascaline Dupas and Roberta Ziparo. 2019. "Investment Decisions with Endogenous Budget Share Allocations Inside the Household." AEA RCT Registry. April 29. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4069/history/45642.
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
see experimental design
Intervention Start Date
2019-05-01
Intervention End Date
2019-08-15
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Experiment 1: decision in public goods game; Experiment 2: willingness to play game, willingness to pay to hide poor performance; Experiment 3: willingness to pay/invest
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
We play three lab-in-the-field experiments (hereafter, “experiment 1, 2 and 3”). These experiments were designed based on the assumptions (experiment 1) and predictions (experiments 2 and 3) of a theoretical model we developed.

We randomly sample approximately 1,000 couples for experiments 1 (with men) and 2 (with women), and approximately 1,000 married women whose spouse is not present from markets for experiment 3.

In experiment 1, we test whether reputation inside the household matters for the share of the budget over which women have control. For this, we randomly vary the salience of the wife’s ability to manage the household budget to test whether transfers from the husband to the wife in a public goods game vary with the husband’s perception of her ability.

In experiment 2, we test whether women care about their reputation inside the household and the extent to which this influences their investment decisions and behavior. For this, we test whether wives forgo the opportunity to play (for pay) a game that could potentially send a bad signal about their ability to their husbands; and if they play the game for money, whether and how much they are willing to pay to hide bad signals about their ability from their husbands. Wives will first play a game that tests their ability to correctly assess the quality of different products, with either help (hints) or no help. We then test whether wives’ willingness to play a game in which their score might be revealed to their husbands (as well as their willingness to pay to improve their score) vary with their score, which we can instrument with having received help (hints) in the game.

In experiment 3, we will measure how the willingness to invest varies with the husband’s perception of the cost and the risk of the investment. We will elicit women’s willingness to pay for assets that have either low or high effort costs, and test whether their willingness to pay varies with their ability to signal to their husbands that the product was acquired for free (free sticker treatment) or has a safe return (benefits sticker treatment).
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Respondents will be assigned a number based on the order in which they are scheduled to be surveyed. We will randomly pre-assign numbers to treatments using statistical software.
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
Around 1,000 couples in experiments 1 and 2 and 1,000 married women in experiment 3
Sample size: planned number of observations
Around 1,000 couples (husbands in experiment 1 and wives in experiment 2) and 1,000 married women in experiment 3
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
- Experiment 1: Salience: 500 men, Control: 500 men

- Experiment 2: Easy game: 500 women, Hard game: 500 women

- Experiment 3:
i) Low-effort-cost product: high perceived cost, high perceived risk: 125, low perceived cost, high perceived risk: 125, high perceived cost, low perceived risk: 125, low perceived cost, low perceived risk: 125
ii) High-effort-cost product: high perceived cost, high perceived risk: 125, low perceived cost, high perceived risk: 125, high perceived cost, low perceived risk: 125, low perceived cost, low perceived risk: 125
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
Stanford University Institutional Review Board
IRB Approval Date
2018-06-21
IRB Approval Number
46636
IRB Name
Malawi National Committee on Research in the Social Sciences and Humanities
IRB Approval Date
2018-11-29
IRB Approval Number
P.06/18/288