Investment Decisions with Endogenous Budget Share Allocations Inside the Household

Last registered on April 29, 2019
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Investment Decisions with Endogenous Budget Share Allocations Inside the Household
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0004069
Initial registration date
April 24, 2019

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
April 29, 2019, 10:44 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
Malawi
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Pascaline Dupas
Affiliation
Princeton University
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Nina Buchmann
PI Affiliation
Stanford University
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PI Name
Roberta Ziparo
PI Affiliation
Aix-Marseille University
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Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2019-05-01
End date
2020-07-31
Keywords
Gender
Additional Keywords
Household Bargaining, Investment
JEL code(s)
C91, D13, O12
Secondary IDs
Abstract
This study aims to understand the dynamic relationship between intra-household bargaining and women's consumption decisions. We want to test whether the share of the household budget over which a woman has control is a function of her prior investment decisions and whether these reputation concerns lead women to avoid risky and hide bad decisions. We use a series of lab-in-the-field experiments to test (1) whether husband transfers vary with the salience of the wife’s ability to manage the budget; (2) whether wives are willing to play a game that will potentially send a signal about their performance to their husbands, and whether and how much they are willing to pay a cost to hide signals of poor performance; and (3) whether wives’ willingness to invest varies with the husband’s perception of the cost and the risk of the investment.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Buchmann, Nina, Pascaline Dupas and Roberta Ziparo. 2019. "Investment Decisions with Endogenous Budget Share Allocations Inside the Household." AEA RCT Registry. April 29. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4069-1.0
Former Citation
Buchmann, Nina, Pascaline Dupas and Roberta Ziparo. 2019. "Investment Decisions with Endogenous Budget Share Allocations Inside the Household." AEA RCT Registry. April 29. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4069/history/45642
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
see experimental design
Intervention Start Date
2019-05-01
Intervention End Date
2019-08-15

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Experiment 1: decision in public goods game; Experiment 2: willingness to play game, willingness to pay to hide poor performance; Experiment 3: willingness to pay/invest
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We play three lab-in-the-field experiments (hereafter, “experiment 1, 2 and 3”). These experiments were designed based on the assumptions (experiment 1) and predictions (experiments 2 and 3) of a theoretical model we developed.

We randomly sample approximately 1,000 couples for experiments 1 (with men) and 2 (with women), and approximately 1,000 married women whose spouse is not present from markets for experiment 3.

In experiment 1, we test whether reputation inside the household matters for the share of the budget over which women have control. For this, we randomly vary the salience of the wife’s ability to manage the household budget to test whether transfers from the husband to the wife in a public goods game vary with the husband’s perception of her ability.

In experiment 2, we test whether women care about their reputation inside the household and the extent to which this influences their investment decisions and behavior. For this, we test whether wives forgo the opportunity to play (for pay) a game that could potentially send a bad signal about their ability to their husbands; and if they play the game for money, whether and how much they are willing to pay to hide bad signals about their ability from their husbands. Wives will first play a game that tests their ability to correctly assess the quality of different products, with either help (hints) or no help. We then test whether wives’ willingness to play a game in which their score might be revealed to their husbands (as well as their willingness to pay to improve their score) vary with their score, which we can instrument with having received help (hints) in the game.

In experiment 3, we will measure how the willingness to invest varies with the husband’s perception of the cost and the risk of the investment. We will elicit women’s willingness to pay for assets that have either low or high effort costs, and test whether their willingness to pay varies with their ability to signal to their husbands that the product was acquired for free (free sticker treatment) or has a safe return (benefits sticker treatment).
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Respondents will be assigned a number based on the order in which they are scheduled to be surveyed. We will randomly pre-assign numbers to treatments using statistical software.
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
Around 1,000 couples in experiments 1 and 2 and 1,000 married women in experiment 3
Sample size: planned number of observations
Around 1,000 couples (husbands in experiment 1 and wives in experiment 2) and 1,000 married women in experiment 3
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
- Experiment 1: Salience: 500 men, Control: 500 men

- Experiment 2: Easy game: 500 women, Hard game: 500 women

- Experiment 3:
i) Low-effort-cost product: high perceived cost, high perceived risk: 125, low perceived cost, high perceived risk: 125, high perceived cost, low perceived risk: 125, low perceived cost, low perceived risk: 125
ii) High-effort-cost product: high perceived cost, high perceived risk: 125, low perceived cost, high perceived risk: 125, high perceived cost, low perceived risk: 125, low perceived cost, low perceived risk: 125
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Malawi National Committee on Research in the Social Sciences and Humanities
IRB Approval Date
2018-11-29
IRB Approval Number
P.06/18/288
IRB Name
Stanford University Institutional Review Board
IRB Approval Date
2018-06-21
IRB Approval Number
46636
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials