x

NEW UPDATE: Completed trials may now upload and register supplementary documents (e.g. null results reports, populated pre-analysis plans, or post-trial results reports) in the Post Trial section under Reports, Papers, & Other Materials.
The Value of Delegation in Hiring
Last registered on June 13, 2019

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
The Value of Delegation in Hiring
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0004172
Initial registration date
June 05, 2019
Last updated
June 13, 2019 8:40 PM EDT
Location(s)
Region
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
Stanford Graduate School of Business
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
University of Toronto Rotman School of Management
Additional Trial Information
Status
On going
Start date
2018-06-01
End date
2019-12-31
Secondary IDs
Abstract
For large chain businesses, local managers are granted various degrees of hiring autonomy from the headquarter. Delegation in hiring, when the managers of a local branch or store are empowered to recruit its own employees, is a popular hiring practice. Yet, causal evidence on the impacts of delegation in hiring on firm performance remains scarce. We run a field experiment in a retail network of 111 stores in China, where we delegate full hiring power in treatment stores. In control group stores, managers are partially delegated recruiting power: they are allowed to recruit employees only when the central HR is unable to fill job vacancies in time.

The first main outcome is employees' demographic characteristics. We choose to target this outcome, because both the firm and Co-PIs are interested in the types of employees preferred by the HR department and local store managers. The second main outcome is individual sales records. One defining feature of our studied setting is the availability of productivity records both at individual and store levels. This allows us to compare the quality of new hires under the treated and control settings. The third main outcome is employee attrition and tenure. We choose to target turnover with our experimental treatment because our studied firm suffers from high turnovers for years and incurs significant costs. Therefore, it seems interesting to investigate whether local hires' tenure is longer, and whether delegated local hiring can reduce turnovers. Finally, we explore the impacts of delegation in hiring on store-level performances (sales, employee satisfaction, etc.).

The stores are divided into one treatment and one control group. Managers of the treated stores are granted full hiring autonomy over 12 months. The experiment starts at the beginning of Sep. 2018.



External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Wu, Hugh Xiaolong and Shannon Liu. 2019. "The Value of Delegation in Hiring." AEA RCT Registry. June 13. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4172-2.0.
Former Citation
Wu, Hugh Xiaolong and Shannon Liu. 2019. "The Value of Delegation in Hiring." AEA RCT Registry. June 13. http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4172/history/48085.
Sponsors & Partners

There are documents in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access to this information.

Request Information
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2018-09-01
Intervention End Date
2019-08-31
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Employee demographic characteristics
Employee productivity (sales)
Personnel turnover and tenure
Store performance data (e.g. sales, employee satisfaction)
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
For large chain businesses, local managers are granted various degrees of hiring autonomy from the headquarter. Delegation in hiring, when the managers of a local branch or store are empowered to recruit its own employees, is a popular hiring practice. Yet, causal evidence on the impacts of delegation in hiring on firm performance remains scarce. We run a field experiment in a retail network of 111 stores in China, where we delegate full hiring power in treatment stores. In control group stores, managers are partially delegated recruiting power: they are allowed to recruit employees only when the central HR is unable to fill job vacancies in time.

The first main outcome is employees' demographic characteristics. We choose to target this outcome, because both the firm and Co-PIs are interested in the types of employees preferred by the HR department and local store managers. The second main outcome is individual sales records. One defining feature of our studied setting is the availability of productivity records both at individual and store levels. This allows us to compare the quality of new hires under the treated and control settings. The third main outcome is employee attrition and tenure. We choose to target turnover with our experimental treatment because our studied firm suffers from high turnovers for years and incurs significant costs. Therefore, it seems interesting to investigate whether local hires' tenure is longer, and whether delegated local hiring can reduce turnovers. Finally, we explore the impacts of delegation in hiring on store-level performances (sales, employee satisfaction, etc.). We give out extra surveys to learn about the mechanisms behind the observed treatment effects, and the perceptions of the hiring policies among store managers.

The stores are divided into one treatment and one control group. Managers of the treated stores are granted full hiring autonomy over 12 months. The experiment starts at the beginning of Sep. 2018.


Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization done by computer
Randomization Unit
Stores
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
111 (=number of stores)
Sample size: planned number of observations
111
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
55 in treatment, 56 in the control group
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
Stanford University Research Compliance Office
IRB Approval Date
2018-11-29
IRB Approval Number
waived by IRB
Post-Trial
Post Trial Information
Study Withdrawal
Intervention
Is the intervention completed?
No
Is data collection complete?
Data Publication
Data Publication
Is public data available?
No
Program Files
Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials
Relevant Paper(s)
REPORTS & OTHER MATERIALS