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Coordination with mitigation uncertainty
Last registered on September 25, 2019

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Coordination with mitigation uncertainty
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0004642
Initial registration date
August 29, 2019
Last updated
September 25, 2019 3:37 AM EDT
Location(s)
Region
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
University of Oslo
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
European University Institute, Florence
Additional Trial Information
Status
In development
Start date
2019-09-05
End date
2019-11-13
Secondary IDs
Abstract
To limit global warming to maximum 2◦C and ideally 1.5◦C, the Paris Agree- ment sets up a system of repeated ’pledge and review’ under which parties to the agreement are supposed to undertake progressively ambitious climate policies. ’Pledge’ involves that parties periodically submit Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), in which they outline the climate actions they plan to undertake. These contributions are subsequently subject to review. Our laboratory experiment is motivated by an observed large variance in the precision level of countries’ emissions reporting in the climate regime. The aim is to experimentally investigate the effects of transparent monitoring of compliance on countries’ ability to coordinate on avoiding a collective catastrophe such as climate change. To do this, we design a public goods game where groups of four contribute to a public good. If a certain threshold is not met subjects lose a portion of their endowment. We conduct a one shot game to investigate how uncertainty about the effectiveness of contribution affects coordination. We also examine this effect in a multi-period game, where subjects contribute over the course of five rounds. In addition, we implement a third treatment in the multi-period game to explore how uncertainty about subjects' contribution but not their effectiveness, affect coordination to reach the threshold.



External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Tørstad, Vegard Heggelund and Vegard Sjurseike Wiborg. 2019. "Coordination with mitigation uncertainty." AEA RCT Registry. September 25. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4642-2.0.
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2019-09-05
Intervention End Date
2019-11-13
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Groups of four contribute to a public good to reach a threshold of collective contributions. Our main outcome is whether groups reach this threshold or not.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
One shot game:
In the control, groups of four invest to reach an investment target. If the groups do not reach the target, subjects suffer a monetary loss. In the treatment group, two subjects choose how much to contribute, but contributions are realised according to a uniform distribution. The other two contribute with certainty.

Multi-period game:
In all of the three treatments, groups of four contribute to a public good over the course of five rounds. In the control, groups of four invest to reach an investment target. If the groups do not reach the target, subjects suffer a monetary loss. In the investment-uncertainty-treatment (IU-treatment), two subjects choose how much to contribute, but contributions are realised according to a uniform distribution. The other two contribute with certainty. In the reporting-uncertainty-treatment, two subjects report the contributions as intervals drawn randomly by a computer, after each round, but there uncertainty about the effectiveness of contributions such as in the IU-treatment. The other two report their exact contributions.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization Unit
We do not compare one shot treatments and multi-period treatments. Hence, individuals are randomly allocated to one of the two one shot treatments and randomly allocated to one of the three multi-period treatments.
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
200 subjects in the one shot game and 300 subjects in the multi-period game.
Sample size: planned number of observations
200 subjects in the one shot treatment and 300 subjects in the multi-period treatments.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
One shot game: 100 subjects in each of the two treatments.
Multi-period game: 100 subjects in each of the three treatments.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial
Post Trial Information
Study Withdrawal
Intervention
Is the intervention completed?
No
Is data collection complete?
Data Publication
Data Publication
Is public data available?
No
Program Files
Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials
Relevant Paper(s)
REPORTS & OTHER MATERIALS