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A Model United Nations experiment on climate change negotiations

Last registered on October 23, 2019
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
A Model United Nations experiment on climate change negotiations
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0004834
Initial registration date
October 09, 2019

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
October 11, 2019, 11:34 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
October 23, 2019, 8:52 AM EDT

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Country
Switzerland
Region
Country
Germany
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Klaus Schmidt
Affiliation
University of Munich
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Elisa Hofmann
PI Affiliation
University of Jena
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Lucas Kyriacou
PI Affiliation
University of Bern
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2018-11-01
End date
2020-07-01
Keywords
Environment & Energy, Governance
Additional Keywords
Negotiations, Climate Change, Model United Nations, Experiment
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Abstract
We organize one-day Model United Nations conferences as Conferences of the Parties (COP) to study climate change negotiations under two different negotiation protocols.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Hofmann, Elisa, Lucas Kyriacou and Klaus Schmidt. 2019. "A Model United Nations experiment on climate change negotiations." AEA RCT Registry. October 23. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4834-1.2
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
See pre-analysis plan (PAP)
Intervention Start Date
2019-10-12
Intervention End Date
2020-07-01

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
See pre-analysis plan (PAP)
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
See pre-analysis plan (PAP)
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
See pre-analysis plan (PAP)
Randomization Unit
See pre-analysis plan (PAP)
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
See pre-analysis plan (PAP)
Sample size: planned number of observations
See pre-analysis plan (PAP)
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
See pre-analysis plan (PAP)
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

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IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Ethikkommission der Volkswirtschaftlichen Fakultät der LMU Munich
IRB Approval Date
2019-05-08
IRB Approval Number
N/A
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
Yes
Intervention Completion Date
December 30, 2019, 12:00 +00:00
Data Collection Complete
Yes
Data Collection Completion Date
December 30, 2019, 12:00 +00:00
Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization)
6
Was attrition correlated with treatment status?
No
Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations
120
Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms
6 teams negotiated according to rules of Paris agreement, 6 teams negotiated a uniform minimum carbon price.
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Abstract
Weitzman, M.L. (2014. Can negotiating a uniform carbon price help to
internalize the global warming externality? J. Assoc. Environ. Resour. Econ. 1: 29–49)
proposed that focusing international climate negotiations on a uniform common
commitment (such as a uniform carbon price) ismore effective than negotiations on
individual commitments (as in the Paris agreement) in achieving ambitious climate
action. We put this hypothesis to an experimental test by simulating international
negotiations on climate change in collaboration with Model United Nations associations.
This novel experimental format combines some of the advantages of lab and
field experiments. Our results offer support for Weitzman’s hypothesis and indicate
that negotiating a common commitment on a uniform carbon pricemay yield higher
emission reductions in the long run and more participation than individual commitments
à la Paris.
Citation
Hofmann, Elisa, Lucas Kyriacou, and Klaus M. Schmidt, A Model United Nations Experiment on Climate Negotiations, Journal of Economics and Statistics 2023, 243(5), 543-566
URL
https://doi.org/10.1515/jbnst-2021-0054

Reports & Other Materials

Description
Dataset
Citation
Hofmann, Elisa; Kyriacou, Lucas; Schmidt, Klaus M. (2022): A Model United Nations Experiment on Climate Negotiations (replication data). Version: 1. Journal of Economics and Statistics. Dataset. http://dx.doi.org/10.15456/jbnst.2022214.0916002267
URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.15456/jbnst.2022214.0916002267