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Can Scorecards Improve Municipal Government Performance? A Field Experiment
Last registered on November 05, 2019

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Can Scorecards Improve Municipal Government Performance? A Field Experiment
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0004953
Initial registration date
November 04, 2019
Last updated
November 05, 2019 9:40 AM EST
Location(s)

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Primary Investigator
Affiliation
Yale University
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
World Bank
Additional Trial Information
Status
On going
Start date
2014-06-01
End date
2020-12-31
Secondary IDs
Abstract
We test if performance scorecards can increase municipal government performance. In a field experiment in Burkina Faso, local decision makers are provided with a scorecard that provides information on national performance standards and on the municipality's actual performance along 16 indicators of service delivery and institutional capacity. Municipal officials are asked to internally assign responsibilities for each performance indicator and are made aware that their performance is being monitored.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Holmlund, Marcus and Malte Lierl. 2019. "Can Scorecards Improve Municipal Government Performance? A Field Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. November 05. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4953-1.0.
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
In a field experiment in Burkina Faso, local decision makers are provided with a scorecard that provides information on national performance standards and on the municipality's actual performance along 16 indicators of service delivery and institutional capacity. Municipal officials are asked to internally assign responsibilities for each performance indicator and are made aware that their performance is being monitored.
Intervention Start Date
2016-11-01
Intervention End Date
2019-01-06
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Municipal government performance, as measured by the scorecard indicators.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Municipal officials' knowledge of performance targets and of actual performance.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
In 70 randomly selected treatment municipalities (blocked by region), municipal performance scorecards are disseminated to key municipal officials in 2016 and in 2017. Baseline data: municipal performance in 2014, 2015, 2016. Midline data: municipal performance in 2017, Endline data: municipal performance in 2018.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Block randomization by region, equal treatment assignment probabilities across all regions.
Randomization Unit
Municipalities
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
140 municipalities
Sample size: planned number of observations
140 municipalities
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
70 treatment municipalities, 70 control municipalities
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
Human Subjects Committee for Innovations for Poverty Action IRB-USA
IRB Approval Date
2018-04-04
IRB Approval Number
14159