Pollution, Productivity and Willingness to Pay for Defensive Investments

Last registered on February 04, 2025
View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Pollution, Productivity and Willingness to Pay for Defensive Investments
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0005364
Initial registration date
February 04, 2020

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
February 07, 2020, 3:43 PM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
February 04, 2025, 10:23 AM EST

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Country
Bangladesh
Region
Dhaka

Primary Investigator

Name
Maulik Jagnani
Affiliation
Tufts University
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Teevrat Garg
PI Affiliation
University of California, San Diego
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2020-01-15
End date
2025-12-31
Keywords
Environment & Energy
Additional Keywords
JEL code(s)
Q50, Q56, Q58, Q53, O13, O10
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial is based on or builds upon one or more prior RCTs.
Abstract
Air quality has become a pressing concern in many developing countries, particularly in South Asia. The 2019 State of Global Air study found that in South Asia, air quality levels represented a loss of 2-3 years in average life expectancy. In Bangladesh, where we propose our study, it was estimated that 200,000 people died in 2017 due to poor air quality. While the human capital costs of air pollution have been documented extensively, there remain major gaps in our understanding of the effects of air pollution and more importantly the ability and willingness of individuals and firms to avoid these damages. We propose a field experiment with randomized allocation of air purifiers in small-scale textile firms in Bangladesh to estimate the effect of air pollution on worker productivity as well as willingness to pay for defensive investments that help reduce exposure to air pollution.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Garg, Teevrat and Maulik Jagnani. 2025. "Pollution, Productivity and Willingness to Pay for Defensive Investments." AEA RCT Registry. February 04. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5364-4.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)


Intervention Start Date
2020-01-15
Intervention End Date
2025-03-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
productivity indicators and willingness to pay measures
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Our research design has two parts: the first part will estimate the effect of pollution on productivity (N = 100 firms); the second part will examine the willingness-to-pay for air pollution purifiers (N = 2500 firms).

Part 1: In the first part, we will randomly sample 100 firms and install air quality monitors in each firm. We will install air purifiers in 50 randomly selected firms for a period of 12 months (treatment group). In our analysis, we will compare productivity indicators between the treatment and control group to estimate the impact of air filters on productivity.

Part 2: In the second part, we will randomly sample 2500 firms.

Baseline Survey Visit: Surveyors will visit 2500 firms and speak to both the factory owner about pollution: Surveyors will conduct a survey, which will include a module on pollution and beliefs about outdoor and indoor pollution levels, effect of pollution on productivity, and the protective effects of air purifiers.

Intervention:

Treatment Group 1: Owners across a random sample of garment factories (firms) in Dhaka informed about indoor pollution levels, effect of pollution on productivity, and the protective effects of air purifiers (from Intervention #1).

Treatment Group 2: Owners across a random sample of garment factories in Dhaka will be provided access to credit to purchase air purifiers.

Treatment Group 3: Owners across a random sample of garment factories in Dhaka will be provided access to a free two-year maintenance contract for the air purifier.

Treatment Group 4: Owners across a random sample of garment factories in Dhaka will be told that they could return the air purifier and get their money back if they don't want to keep it after a month of use.

Treatment Group 5: Owners across a random sample of garment factories in Dhaka will be told that they only need to pay for the air purifier if they want to keep it after a month of use.

Treatment Group 6: Treatment Group 1 + Treatment Group 2
Treatment Group 7: Treatment Group 1 + Treatment Group 3
Treatment Group 8: Treatment Group 1 + Treatment Group 4
Treatment Group 9: Treatment Group 1 + Treatment Group 5

Willingness-to-Pay Experiment: At the end, factory owners will be asked to take part in a real-stakes willingness-to-pay experiment; we will elicit willingness to pay for air purifiers using an incentive-compatible Becker-deGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism.

In our analysis, we will simply compare willingness-to-pay estimates across owners in the treatment and control groups.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization Unit
Unit of randomization: garment factories (firms)
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
Intervention #1: 100 firms

Intervention #2: 2500 firms
Sample size: planned number of observations
Intervention #1: 2000 workers Intervention #2: 2500 firm owners
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Intervention #1: 50 garment factories/firms in the control group, 50 garment factories/firms in the control group

Intervention #2: 250 garment factories/firms in the control group, 250 garment factories/firms in each of the 9 treatment groups.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Innovations for Poverty Action - USA
IRB Approval Date
2019-12-19
IRB Approval Number
15026
IRB Name
Institute of Health Economics, University of Dhaka
IRB Approval Date
2023-05-03
IRB Approval Number
N/A
Analysis Plan