Is there a link between wealth inequality and deception? – An experimental analysis of different subject pools

Last registered on June 04, 2020

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Is there a link between wealth inequality and deception? – An experimental analysis of different subject pools
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0005399
Initial registration date
February 05, 2020

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
February 07, 2020, 1:53 PM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
June 04, 2020, 10:19 PM EDT

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2020-02-16
End date
2020-03-16
Secondary IDs
German Research Foundation (DFG, German Research Foundation) –388911356.
Abstract
This paper investigates experimentally the relationship between inequality in initial wealth and deception. Our basic design is adopted from Gneezy (2005): two players interact in a deception game. It is common knowledge that player 1 has private information about the payoffs for both players of two alternative actions. Player 1 sends a message to player 2, indicating which alternative putatively will end up in a higher payoff for player 2. The message, which can either be true or false, does not affect the payoffs of the players. Player 2 has no information about the payoffs. However, player 2 selects one of the two alternatives A or B, which is payoff-relevant for both players. We extend Gneezy (2005) by two elements. First, we systematically vary the initial wealth of the players 1 and 2 (common knowledge to both of them). Second, we do not limit ourselves to the standard population of university students but also recruit chess players that are not enrolled in any degree program. Doing so, we want to find out if our results remain robust over a non-standard subject population which is known to be experienced to some extent in strategic interactions.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Gruener, Sven. 2020. "Is there a link between wealth inequality and deception? – An experimental analysis of different subject pools ." AEA RCT Registry. June 04. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5399-1.1
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
We extend the basic idea of Gneezy’s (2005) design to systematic variations in wealth. Altogether, we examine 3 scenarios (1 reference scenario and 2 treatment scenarios; Table 2). While there is no variation of the initial wealth in the reference scenario (both players have €0 initial wealth), treatment 1 provides player 1 with a surplus in initial wealth and treatment 2 provides player 2 a surplus. Player 1 and player 2 know that the initial wealth in the respective treatments is common knowledge to both players.
Intervention Start Date
2020-02-16
Intervention End Date
2020-03-16

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Primary outcome variables: Depending on the role of the experimental subject (either player 1 or player 2), the key variable of interest is either “decision player 1” (honest/dishonest message) or “decision player 2” (follow/not follow message).
We are mostly interested in the behavioral influence of the treatments on these primary outcome variables.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The basic structure of the experiment is adopted from Gneezy’s (2005) 2-person deception game. Two players play against each other in a one-shot experiment. We extend the basic idea of Gneezy’s (2005) design to systematic variations in wealth as well as a comparison of students and chess players.
Experimental Design Details
--> Complete Design is attached as a separate file.
Randomization Method
Subjects are equally likely to be part of one of the treatments. Randomization is done by the software which we use.
Randomization Unit
Subjects are randomly assigned to one treatment. Thus, individual is our randomization unit.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
We have 6 treatments (chess players) and 6 treatments (students); we do not cluster them.
Sample size: planned number of observations
We observe the decisions of N=360 subjects in a one-shot experiment.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
 We plan to recruit N=180 students and N=180 non-student chess-players. The total number of subjects per scenario and population (N=30) results from budget constraints.
 Uncertainty about the success in recruiting non-students: we are ex-ante not sure if a sufficient number of non-student chess players could be recruited or if the spectrum of non-students has to be extended to subjects that are not playing chess in a club.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

Documents

Document Name
IRB
Document Type
irb_protocol
Document Description
File
IRB

MD5: 2235c60732f47ea2351c7e3ca1139618

SHA1: fc52eb911dc4507c257c5f95e6d973a1bff28d9c

Uploaded At: February 05, 2020

Document Name
Experimental Design
Document Type
proposal
Document Description
File
Experimental Design

MD5: ed795cdff8f8694f36e2b0fa09fba2fa

SHA1: cd1d1b754eec0282d282d178c14a545837505791

Uploaded At: February 05, 2020

IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
German Association for Experimental Economic Research e.V.
IRB Approval Date
2020-01-23
IRB Approval Number
sZXeRf5E
Analysis Plan

Analysis Plan Documents

Research+questions+++analysis+plan.pdf

MD5: 8e1487d26ad687fd4bd8c041ab4ac5c4

SHA1: 8940e4d1a0c30476863287df2c6374072e3cef0b

Uploaded At: February 05, 2020

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
Yes
Intervention Completion Date
March 11, 2020, 12:00 +00:00
Data Collection Complete
Yes
Data Collection Completion Date
March 11, 2020, 12:00 +00:00
Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization)
two subject groups were randomly assigned to 6 treatments
Was attrition correlated with treatment status?
Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations
N=360 subjects (180 students, 180 non-student chess-players)
Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms
6 Treatments, 60 subjects per treatment (equally distributed among students and non-student chess-players)
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

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Program Files

Program Files
No
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Abstract
Citation
Gruener, S., & Khassine, I. (2020, April 6). Is there a link between endowment inequality and deception? – An experimental analysis of different subject pools. https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/rmzn4

Reports & Other Materials