Is there a link between wealth inequality and deception? – An experimental analysis of different subject pools

Last registered on February 07, 2020

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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title

Is there a link between wealth inequality and deception? – An experimental analysis of different subject pools

RCT ID

AEARCTR-0005399

Initial registration date

February 05, 2020

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published

February 07, 2020, 1:53 PM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country

Germany

Region

Primary Investigator

Name

Sven Gruener

Affiliation

Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg

Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status

In development

Start date

2020-02-16

End date

2020-03-16

Keywords

Crime, Violence, & Conflict

Additional Keywords

Deception, wealth inequality, experimental subjects, cheap talk, asymmetric information

JEL code(s)

C91, D01, D31

Secondary IDs

German Research Foundation (DFG, German Research Foundation) –388911356.

Abstract

This paper investigates experimentally the relationship between inequality in initial wealth and deception. Our basic design is adopted from Gneezy (2005): two players interact in a deception game. It is common knowledge that player 1 has private information about the payoffs for both players of two alternative actions. Player 1 sends a message to player 2, indicating which alternative putatively will end up in a higher payoff for player 2. The message, which can either be true or false, does not affect the payoffs of the players. Player 2 has no information about the payoffs. However, player 2 selects one of the two alternatives A or B, which is payoff-relevant for both players. We extend Gneezy (2005) by two elements. First, we systematically vary the initial wealth of the players 1 and 2 (common knowledge to both of them). Second, we do not limit ourselves to the standard population of university students but also recruit chess players that are not enrolled in any degree program. Doing so, we want to find out if our results remain robust over a non-standard subject population which is known to be experienced to some extent in strategic interactions.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation

Gruener, Sven. 2020. "Is there a link between wealth inequality and deception? – An experimental analysis of different subject pools ." AEA RCT Registry. February 07. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5399-1.0

Sponsors & Partners

Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

We extend the basic idea of Gneezy’s (2005) design to systematic variations in wealth. Altogether, we examine 3 scenarios (1 reference scenario and 2 treatment scenarios; Table 2). While there is no variation of the initial wealth in the reference scenario (both players have €0 initial wealth), treatment 1 provides player 1 with a surplus in initial wealth and treatment 2 provides player 2 a surplus. Player 1 and player 2 know that the initial wealth in the respective treatments is common knowledge to both players.

Intervention Start Date

2020-02-16

Intervention End Date

2020-03-16

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)

Primary outcome variables: Depending on the role of the experimental subject (either player 1 or player 2), the key variable of interest is either “decision player 1” (honest/dishonest message) or “decision player 2” (follow/not follow message).
We are mostly interested in the behavioral influence of the treatments on these primary outcome variables.

Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)

Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

The basic structure of the experiment is adopted from Gneezy’s (2005) 2-person deception game. Two players play against each other in a one-shot experiment. We extend the basic idea of Gneezy’s (2005) design to systematic variations in wealth as well as a comparison of students and chess players.

Experimental Design Details

--> Complete Design is attached as a separate file.

Randomization Method

Subjects are equally likely to be part of one of the treatments. Randomization is done by the software which we use.

Randomization Unit

Subjects are randomly assigned to one treatment. Thus, individual is our randomization unit.

Was the treatment clustered?

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters

We have 6 treatments (chess players) and 6 treatments (students); we do not cluster them.

Sample size: planned number of observations

We observe the decisions of N=360 subjects in a one-shot experiment.

Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms

 We plan to recruit N=180 students and N=180 non-student chess-players. The total number of subjects per scenario and population (N=30) results from budget constraints.
 Uncertainty about the success in recruiting non-students: we are ex-ante not sure if a sufficient number of non-student chess players could be recruited or if the spectrum of non-students has to be extended to subjects that are not playing chess in a club.

Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)

Supporting Documents and Materials

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