x

NEW UPDATE: Completed trials may now upload and register supplementary documents (e.g. null results reports, populated pre-analysis plans, or post-trial results reports) in the Post Trial section under Reports, Papers, & Other Materials.
Shifting the reward for kind delegation
Last registered on June 22, 2020

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Shifting the reward for kind delegation
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0006036
Initial registration date
June 21, 2020
Last updated
June 22, 2020 11:48 AM EDT
Location(s)
Region
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
Tilburg University
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
Tilburg University
PI Affiliation
Tilburg University
Additional Trial Information
Status
In development
Start date
2020-06-22
End date
2020-07-31
Secondary IDs
Abstract
Recent experimental research shows that responsibility attribution can be shifted by delegating to a third party. Existing studies focus on the change in punishment patterns for the delegation of unkind decisions. There are not enough observations for the delegation of kind decisions, and little evidence of such responsibility shifting pattern for kind delegation. We run an online experiment with a delegated dictator game, and examine the reward patterns of the recipients for the fair option. This connects with the existing evidence and helps provide a general picture of responsibility attribution in delegation.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Argenton, Cedric , Jan Potters and Yadi Yang. 2020. "Shifting the reward for kind delegation." AEA RCT Registry. June 22. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6036-1.0.
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2020-06-22
Intervention End Date
2020-07-31
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Rewarding behaviors of recipients to dictators with fair decisions and to dictators who delegate to a fair agent
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
The game takes the format of a dictator game, with an option or the dictator to delegation the decision to another agent, and the option for the recipient to reward or punish the dictator and/or the delegate.
Experimental Design Details
The game follows the design of the delegated dictator game of Bartling and Fischbacher (2012). Four types of players are matched together: a dictator, a potential delegate, and two recipients. The dictator chooses between two options: a) a fair option that allocates 5 points for each player, and b) an unfair option that allocates 9 points each to the dictator and the delegate and 1 point each to the two receivers. The dictator has the option to delegate the decision to the delegate. Each receiver can reward the dictator and the delegate. Each receiver allocates rewarding a total of up to 7 rewarding points to the principal and the delegate. The game is played in strategy method. The dictator decides to either choose between the two allocations him/herself, or to delegate the decision. The delegate needs to make the allocation decision before knowing whether the dictator has chosen to delegate or not. Both receivers assigns rewarding points for all four possible scenarios. The allocation is implemented according to the choice of the matched dictator and/or delegate. The rewarding points of one of the two receivers is randomly selected by a computerized die row to be implemented. Treatments: Jun 22 - Dictator game with delegation but no reward - Dictator game with no delegation but with reward - Dictator game with delegation and reward - Dictator game with delegation and punishment After data collection from the delegation and reward treatment finishes: - Dictator game with delegation and reward, but the dictator can only delegate to a randomized die row whose probability distribution equal to the delegate's behaviors from the delegation and reward treatment. (Thus data collection for this treatment can only start after data collection from the delegation and reward treatment finishes.) - Dictator game with delegation and reward, but the dictator can only choose the unfair allocation if he/she chooses not to delegate The experiment will be run on Prolific with the following pre-screening restrictions: - Students - Completed degree is high school or above - US residents - Prolific approval rate at least 90% - Age: 18-30
Randomization Method
Randomization by computer
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
1200 individuals
Sample size: planned number of observations
1200 individuals
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
200 individuals per treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
TiSEM Institution Review Board
IRB Approval Date
2020-05-20
IRB Approval Number
IRB EXE 2020-011
Post-Trial
Post Trial Information
Study Withdrawal
Intervention
Is the intervention completed?
No
Is data collection complete?
Data Publication
Data Publication
Is public data available?
No
Program Files
Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials
Relevant Paper(s)
REPORTS & OTHER MATERIALS