How does the Organization of Crowdsourcing Affect Labor Supply, Productivity and Morals

Last registered on June 25, 2021

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
How does the Organization of Crowdsourcing Affect Labor Supply, Productivity and Morals
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0006242
Initial registration date
June 23, 2021
Last updated
June 25, 2021, 1:40 PM EDT

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
University of Bremen

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
University of Bremen

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2021-06-28
End date
2022-01-01
Secondary IDs
DFG HO 5296/3-1
Abstract
The organization of crowdsourcing comes in various forms. The most common organizational forms are crowd labor markets, crowd collaborative communities, and crowd contests. In this paper, we experimentally study labor supply, productivity, and morals under these three organizational forms of crowdsourcing.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Hornuf, Lars and Kristina Klein. 2021. "How does the Organization of Crowdsourcing Affect Labor Supply, Productivity and Morals." AEA RCT Registry. June 25. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6242-1.0
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
There are two interventions:

(1) Organizational form of crowdsourcing

(a) crowd labor market
(b) crowd collaborative community
(c) crowd contest

(2) Degree of overpay

(a) low
(b) high
Intervention Start Date
2021-06-28
Intervention End Date
2021-07-06

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Labor supply
Labor productivity
Reaction to overpay
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Labor supply is a positive decision by a participant to continue working after the focal crowdsourcing round. On the individual level, this is a dummy for each participant.

Labor productivity is the average time a participant needs to successfully solve a grid during a particular crowdsourcing round. On the individual level, this variable measures the time in seconds needed to successfully complete a grid.

Reaction to overpay is a positive decision by a participant to return the overpaid remuneration to the experimenter in a franked return envelope. On the individual level, this is a dummy for each subject.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
We investigate the following second-order effects: the extent of overpay (low = EUR 1.00, high = EUR 5.00) and how it affects participants reaction to overpay.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We have designed a randomized control trial, in which participants will be randomly assigned to different treatment groups (crowd labor markets, crowd collaborative communities, and crowd contests) and extents of overpay. We use two controlled manipulations: organizational form of crowdsourcing and extent of overpay. The experiment is followed by a questionnaire in order to conduct balancing checks.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
We will randomly allocate sessions (and thus participants) with 1/3 probability to the crowd labor market, crowd collaborative community, and crowd contest treatment. If only one participant signs up for an experimental session, the session must be a crowd labor market session. Treatment status is assigned on the group level.
Randomization Unit
The unit of randomization is the experimental sessions.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
210 individual participants from the BreLAB pool
Sample size: planned number of observations
210 individual participants from the BreLAB pool
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
70 crowd labor markets treatment, 70 crowd contest treatment, 70 crowd collaborative community treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

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IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Gesellschaft für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung e.V. (GfeW)
IRB Approval Date
2021-06-21
IRB Approval Number
U6Lrtnw7
Analysis Plan

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