Primary Outcomes (explanation)
We hypothesize that climate- or covid-shocks affect women's political preferences and behavior, as well as attitudes towards women's political participation, by altering the following:
1. Women's burdens for household survival: Relatively to pre-crisis levels, shocks may magnify female domestic responsibilities, for instance providing food, water or care. Shocks may also present a need for women to engage in economic activity and generate resources. Further, these shocks may disproportionately increase the risks and responsibilities women bear (relative to men) for ensuring personal and familial survival.
2. Domain of women's agency: Chiefly, shocks can alter women's agency by changing the proportion of household income earned by women, the composition of the household and women's involvement in household decision-making.
The testable hypotheses that follow from the above are as follows:
H1. Climate shocks increase women's burdens for household survival and the domain
of their agency, thereby:
(a) increasing women's preferences for change
(b) changing the perception of political participation as \allowable" for women
(c) increasing women's political demands
H2. COVID-19 shocks increase women's burdens for household survival but reduce
the domain of their agency, thereby:
(a) increasing women's preferences for change
(b) leaving perceptions of political participation as \allowable" for women unchanged
(c) reducing women's political demands
Note that overall, the combined effect of climate shocks and COVID-19 on women's political participation is theoretically ambiguous. Our expectation is that, where both shocks apply, the relative magnitude of each shock's impact on the scope of gendered agency will predict which shock drives gendered political preferences and behavior.
The dynamic underlying these hypotheses is that these crises affect political outcomes based on how they alter economic livelihoods, as well as gendered patterns of migration and economic opportunity. Specifically, we expect that climate change-induced disasters are likely to induce male out-migration (from rural to urban areas) and pressure both men and women to generate new income. If so, female economic (and social) contributions to the household should increase alongside their financial autonomy post-crises, opening new opportunities for women's political engagement and an impetus to rethink traditional (political, social, and economic) preferences.
In contrast, we expect the COVID-19 crisis increases reverse migration (men returning from urban to rural areas) and reduces economic opportunities, particularly for women. In this case, female economic contributions and autonomy should diminish in the wake of COVID-19, reducing opportunities for women's political engagement and increasing pressure to support traditional preferences. The simultaneous experience of both crises
may either magnify both the impetus and capacity for women's political engagement--if, for instance both COVID-19 and climate shocks are perceived as unjustly diminishing women's current economic returns relative to female expectations pre-crisis, and these shocks simultaneously expand demands for women to contribute more to their households, broadening their agency to collectively reshape future opportunities--or, where COVID- 19 is most severe, rigidly-enforced lockdowns may dominate household calculations and thus magnify the restrictions on women's political engagement.