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Field
Abstract
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Before
The goal of our study is to causally estimate of the effects of noncompetes themselves on the employment outcomes of workers. To do this, we propose to run a large field experiment in which we occupy the role of the employer. As the employer we can randomly assign noncompetes and their salience, as well as wage offers, to examine how the assignment of noncompetes affects individual willingness to accept a job offer. We can also examine subsequent employment outcomes for the workers, and even directly test the worker’s willingness to violate the noncompete by working with a second employer seeking to hire the workers.
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After
The goal of our study is to causally estimate of the effects of noncompetes themselves on the employment outcomes of workers. To do this, we propose to run a large field experiment where we work alongside an employer to randomly assign noncompetes and their salience, as well as wage offers, to examine how the assignment of noncompetes affects individual willingness to accept a job offer. We can also examine subsequent employment outcomes for the workers, and even directly test the worker’s willingness to violate the noncompete by working with a second employer seeking to hire the workers.
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Field
Last Published
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Before
May 22, 2023 10:02 PM
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After
June 21, 2023 12:14 AM
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Field
Intervention (Public)
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Before
We propose hiring professional HR workers, who will be tasked with reviewing and screening resumes. For HR workers who respond to our job ad, our experimental design involves three dimensions of randomization. In the job offer we will randomly assign the use of a noncompete, the salience of the noncompete, and wages. We describe these more in the hidden fields in order to keep the interventions private from potential subjects.
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After
We propose to work with a firm to hire professional HR workers, who will be tasked with reviewing and screening resumes. For HR workers who respond to our job ad, our experimental design involves three dimensions of randomization. In the job offer we will randomly assign the use of a noncompete, the salience of the noncompete, and wages. We describe these more in the hidden fields in order to keep the interventions private from potential subjects.
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Field
Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
For HR workers who respond to our job ad, our experimental design involves three dimensions of randomization related to the job offer. We describe these more in the hidden fields in order to keep the interventions private from potential subjects.
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After
For HR workers who respond to the job ad, our experimental design involves three dimensions of randomization related to the job offer. We describe these more in the hidden fields in order to keep the interventions private from potential subjects.
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Field
Intervention (Hidden)
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Before
We propose hiring professional HR workers, who will be tasked with reviewing and screening resumes. For HR workers who respond to our job ad, our experimental design involves three dimensions of randomization. For each randomization, we describe the treatment and the outcomes we seek to link to the randomized treatment.
Our first randomization relates to the use of a noncompete in the job offer. The second randomization is how salient the noncompete is in the onboarding materials. And the third randomization is the wage offer. We describe the six treatment and control groups below.
1. No Noncompete, Low Wage: We offer the worker an employment contract including a nondisclosure agreement (NDA). No noncompete agreement would be included. The offered wage would be the 25th percentile of the wage distribution, which is approximately $20/hr.
2. No Noncompete, High Wage: Same as condition 1, except the offered waged is the 75th percentile of the wage distribution, approximately $40/hr.
3. Noncompete, Full Transparency, Low Wage: The worker receives an employment contract including an NDA and (separately) a clearly labeled noncompete agreement in a standalone document. The offered wage will be the 25th percentile of the wage distribution (~$20/hr). This condition includes mentioning the noncompete in the initial job post. We refer to this as our "full transparency" condition because there is no way the worker can sign the employment agreement without seeing the noncompete.
4. Noncompete, Full Transparency, High Wage: Same as 3, but with the high wage (~75th percentile of wage distribution, $40/hr).
5. Noncompete, Low Transparency, Low Wage: Same as 2, except the worker receives an employment contract that contains (in one document) both the NDA and the noncompete provisions. This is less transparent treatment as the noncompete is inside a larger contract, requiring the worker to notice it. The worker does not need to sign the noncompete separately.
6. Noncompete, Low Transparency, High Wage: Same as 5, except for the high wage.
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After
We propose to work with a firm to hire professional HR workers, who will be tasked with reviewing and screening resumes. For HR workers who respond to our job ad, our experimental design involves three dimensions of randomization. For each randomization, we describe the treatment and the outcomes we seek to link to the randomized treatment.
Our first randomization relates to the use of a noncompete in the job offer. The second randomization is how salient the noncompete is in the onboarding materials. And the third randomization is the wage offer. We describe the six treatment and control groups below.
1. No Noncompete, Low Wage: We offer the worker an employment contract including a nondisclosure agreement (NDA). No noncompete agreement would be included. The offered wage would be the 25th percentile of the wage distribution, which is approximately $25/hr.
2. No Noncompete, High Wage: Same as condition 1, except the offered waged is the 75th percentile of the wage distribution, approximately $60/hr.
3. Noncompete, Full Transparency, Low Wage: The worker receives an employment contract including an NDA and (separately) a clearly labeled noncompete agreement in a standalone document. The offered wage will be the 25th percentile of the wage distribution (~$25/hr). This condition includes mentioning the noncompete in the initial job post. We refer to this as our "full transparency" condition because there is no way the worker can sign the employment agreement without seeing the noncompete.
4. Noncompete, Full Transparency, High Wage: Same as 3, but with the high wage (~75th percentile of wage distribution, $60/hr).
5. Noncompete, Low Transparency, Low Wage: Same as 2, except the worker receives an employment contract that contains (in one document) both the NDA and the noncompete provisions. This is less transparent treatment as the noncompete is inside a larger contract, requiring the worker to notice it. The worker does not need to sign the noncompete separately.
6. Noncompete, Low Transparency, High Wage: Same as 5, except for the high wage.
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